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Abstract 
The European Parliament is the European Union’s sole democratically elected institution, 
with elections held within the member states every 5 years. In 2019, amidst negotiations on 
the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, known as Brexit, the British public went to the 
polls to elect a cohort of Members of European Parliament, with the knowledge they would 
be expelled from the parliament upon the completion of Brexit. This thesis examines who 
these MEPs were and their career paths, examining their political experiences before and 
after sitting in the European Parliament, and analyses the factors which influenced their 
political careers.  
  




In May 2019, despite having voted to withdraw from the European Union (EU) three years 
prior, voters in the United Kingdom (UK) went to the polls to elect a cohort of 73 Members of 
European Parliament (MEPs) to sit in the European Parliament (EP), as part of the EU-wide 
2019 European Parliament elections. Despite reluctance from both the EU and the UK 
Government, as a full legal member of the EU, the UK was legally obligated to elect MEPs to 
fill its quota of representatives in the EP (Walker, 2021). In doing so, an unprecedented 
scenario was created, in which a national cohort of MEPs had been elected with the 
knowledge that they would not sit a complete term in office, as their terms would be cut 
short prematurely when the UK fully withdrew from the EU. Due to the irregular circumstance 
of the election, it provides a unique opportunity to contribute to the field of study of politician 
career paths, specifically the role that the European Parliament has in the careers of 
politicians. This thesis will examine political experience and backgrounds of the candidates, 
as well as their career choices following their departure from the EP, specifically to what 
level they have remained politically active.  
 
1.1 Context 
In order to understand the full intricacies of the 2019 EP election in the UK, this section will 
provide the full context of the events leading directly up to the election. This section will also 
include the mechanics by which the UK elects MEPs to the EP, and an overview of the office 
of MEP. 
1.1.1 Political Context for the 2019 European Parliament Election in the UK 
On June 23, 2016, in a nation-wide referendum, the population of the United Kingdom voted 
51.89% in favour to withdraw from the EU. This result prompted the resignation of Prime 
Minister David Cameron, who had promised the referendum in his 2015 election campaign, 
despite campaigning to remain. His replacement, Theresa May, formally began the process 
of negotiating withdrawal from the EU on March 29, 2017. This process, as per Article 50 of 
the Treaty on European Union (2009), was to take two years, setting March 29, 2019, as the 
ultimate date upon which the UK would complete its withdrawal (May, 2017). With May’s 
government holding a slim majority of 12 seats in the House of Commons, and with a large 
lead over the opposition Labour Party, May’s government called an early general election 
with the aim of strengthening her mandate to negotiate withdrawal terms (Kavanagh, 2018).  
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However, the 2017 general election did not produce a favourable result for May’s 
government. Instead of producing a clear mandate with which the Conservative Party could 
negotiate their withdrawal terms with the EU, an unexpectedly resurgent Labour Party, led by 
firmly left-wing Jeremy Corbyn, outperformed polling and won enough seats to create a hung 
parliament (Heath and Goodwin, 2017). Also of note during the 2017 general election was 
the collapse of prominent Eurosceptic United Kingdom Independence Party, dropping from 
winning nearly 13% of the vote in the 2015 general election to merely 1.2% in 2017. While 
still winning a plurality of seats, the Conservative party did not win a majority, and as such 
agreed to a confidence and supply agreement with the right-wing Northern Irish Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP).  
The lack of a decisive mandate for withdrawal negotiations created a significant hindrance 
for May’s Government throughout the process of negotiating a withdrawal agreement with 
the EU. The process of negotiation with the EU itself proved to be a challenge, as it became 
clear that the UK overestimated their strength as an economic power and the position from 
which they were bargaining (Schnapper, 2020). Widely held British assumptions that the EU 
would be willing to compromise on its principles to strike a special deal with the UK, and that 
bilateral negotiations with individual member-states would allow the UK to leverage off of 
internal EU disunity proved to be misguided (Figueira and Martill, 2020). Instead, the UK’s 
negotiating team was met with a united EU unwilling to offer bespoke arrangements. 
Contrary to expectations, solidarity between the EU27 held strong throughout the Brexit 
negotiation This disparity between assumptions and reality, combined with a negotiation 
team composed of civil servants isolated from the Conservative Party MPs, led to internal 
party strife. Two Conservative cabinet members, Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union David Davis, and Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, both resigned due to their refusal 
to support the Chequers Plan, a government white paper detailing the first detailed vision of 
post-withdrawal EU-UK relations, just prior to its publication on 12 June 2018 (Jensen and 
Kelstrup, 2019). While the EU rejected the terms of the Chequers Plan, after another round of 
negotiations, a mutually acceptable withdrawal agreement was reached between the EU and 
UK negotiation teams on 14 November 2018 (May, 2018).  
While the May government had successfully negotiated a withdrawal agreement with the EU 
itself, this agreement was met with disapproval from a number of factions within parliament, 
both from opposition parties and factions inside the Conservatives (Schnapper, 2020). 
Opposition parties such as Labour, who favoured a “softer” Brexit, and the Liberal 
Democrats, who favoured a second referendum on withdrawal, opposed the terms of 
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withdrawal agreement, consistently voted down proposed Brexit legislature. Internal factions 
within the Conservative Party also objected to the negotiated withdrawal agreement, with 
Brexit hardliners opposing the deal on the grounds that it ceded too much ground to the EU, 
favouring little to no future co-operation with the EU. Other Conservative MPs, including 
those who had campaigned to remain in the 2016 referendum, opposed the deal on the 
basis that it distanced the UK too far from the EU, preferring to maintain closer ties post-
withdrawal (Aidt et al., 2021).  
Further complicating the matter was the stance of the DUP and the issue of the Northern 
Irish border. The Good Friday Agreement, the treaty governing the border between the 
Republic of Ireland (an EU member-state) and Northern Ireland (as part of the UK who were 
at that time also an EU member-state), had established a soft border between the two based 
on their membership of the EU and the European Single Market, which would be disrupted by 
Brexit. The DUP, a firmly Unionist party against any integration with the Republic of Ireland, 
were in opposition to any agreement which offered Northern Ireland any deal which differed 
from the rest of the UK (Keating, 2021). The DUP were also the sole Northern Irish party in 
the Westminster parliament at the time due to opposition Republican party, Sinn Fein, 
winning 11 seats but refusing to take them as part of their policy of abstentionism. 
Independent Unionist MP Sylvia Hermon was the only other politician to win a seat in 
Northern Ireland in 2017, voting in favour of May’s withdrawal agreement. Consequently, the 
DUP opposed the passage of the withdrawal agreement as it created a scenario in which 
Northern Ireland remained within the EU’s customs area. 
Further complicating the issue of withdrawing from the UK was division between the internal 
nations of the UK itself. While the voting population of UK as a whole voted to leave the EU, 
with a margin of 52% in favour, this result was not unanimous between the four constituent 
nations of the UK. While England and Wales both overall voted in favour of leaving, Northern 
Ireland and Scotland both voted overall in favour of remaining within the EU. With a pro-
remain majority in the Scottish Parliament, and an overall pro-EU sentiment in the Northern 
Ireland Assembly due to the EU’s role in maintaining the peace process, the issue of the 
devolved sovereignty within the UK was seen as posing a potential challenge to the process 
of withdrawing from the EU (Wellings, 2021). However, rulings from the High and Supreme 
Courts in 2016 and 2017 respectively established that the right of a meaningful vote on the 
terms of withdrawal belonged to Westminster, not the devolved parliaments, furthering the 
divide between Northern Ireland and Scotland with England, and to a lesser extent Wales. 
This national divide was echoed in the opinions of English Conservative voters, who were 
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consistently found when polled to view Scottish Independence and the collapse of the 
Northern Irish peace process as a price they were willing to pay to ensure withdrawal went 
through (Wellings, 2021).  
Due to this parliamentary deadlock over the terms of the withdrawal agreement, the 
withdrawal agreement was voted down three times at Westminster, with a number of other 
Brexit proposals, including withdrawing unilaterally without an agreement, known as a no-
deal Brexit, also being rejected by parliament. This lack of progress resulted in the UK and 
EU agreeing to extend the deadline for the UK to leave the EU to 31 October 2019 (Walker, 
2021). This deadline extension, however, came with the caveat that as per European law, the 
UK would be required to elect their allocated 73 MEPs to the European Parliament in the 
2019 election, scheduled to take place between 23 and 26 May (Fella, 2019). This 
requirement was due to the UK legally still being a full member of the EU and therefore being 
legally obligated to participate in the election, as there were concerns that should the UK’s 
allocated seats go unfilled, or filled via appointment rather than election, all actions taken by 
the EP could be legally challenged (Fella, 2019).  
This created a unique situation in the EU’s history, as the MEPs elected in the 2019 EP 
election would be elected with the expectation that they would be recalled within a few 
months, as the renegotiated withdrawal deadline had been set for 31 October 2019 (the date 
upon which the UK fully withdrew from the EU would ultimately be 31 January 2020). While 
some MEPs have sat terms shorter than the standard 5-year terms (either due to the nation 
joining the EU and electing a cohort of MEPs mid-term, or an individual MEP standing down), 
there has never been a scenario in which an entire country’s cohort of MEPs have been 
recalled from the EP before the completion of their term.  
  
1.1.2 European Parliament Elections in the UK 
In electing its 73 MEPs to the EP, the UK was divided into 12 regions: one each for Scotland, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland, and 9 for regions of England. Each region elects a number of 
MEPs closely proportional to their population via proportional representation (Thimont Jack 
et al., 2019). All regions except Northern Ireland use the D’Hondt system, which allocates 
seats in electorates on a sequential method, dividing the highest vote total by the number of 
seats allocated plus one, awarding the seat to the highest remaining vote total, then 
repeating until no seats are left unallocated (Pagel, 2019). Northern Ireland uses the Single 
Transferable Vote system, a system in which voters rank candidates on their ballot in order 
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of preference. The vote is then tallied in rounds, with the least preferred candidate being 
eliminated and their votes transferred to the voter’s second preferred candidate, with rounds 
repeating until the remaining candidates equal the number of seats being elected (Electoral 
Reform Society, 2017). Northern Ireland has used this system since the introduction of 
elections to the European Parliament in 1979 as this mirrors the same system used by the 
Republic of Ireland, as well as being the system used in elections to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly. The rest of the UK adopted proportional representation for EP elections in 1999, 
prior to which the First Past The Post system was used in which seats are awarded purely on 
basis of highest number of votes received in a given electorate (Robinson, 2010). The EP 
elections were the only nationwide elections in the UK to use proportional representation, as 
general elections to the House of Commons use FPTP. Elections to the regional assemblies 
of the Scottish Parliament, the Senedd, and the London Assembly use the Additional 
Member System, a hybrid system which uses both single member electorates and regional 
proportionally assigned seats.  
One key consequence of the use of proportional representation compared to FPTP is the 
process by which candidates are selected and elected. In FPTP, which uses a number of 
single member electorates elected by a simple majority, for which candidates usually 
selected to run with the appeal of the individual candidate to the individual electorate in 
mind. However, the proportional representation used in elections to the EP does not allow 
voters to directly choose an individual candidate to vote for, instead voting for a party from 
whom a proportional number of candidates from their list are elected (Robinson, 2010). As 
such, a candidate’s position on this list is the primary determinant of their chance of 
election, which in turn is determined by their good standings within their political party. This 
has the effect of concentrating power towards the political parties themselves, as while in 
FPTP systems the support of the party of a candidate has a strong influence on their 
electability, in a proportional representation system like the one used in the EP elections in 
the UK, the party has a much stronger influence on who is allowed to run, with candidates 
ranking higher in their lists having much greater chances of being elected.  
This election was contested all by parties with elected representatives in the UK at the time, 
as well as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which had won 24 of the 73 UK 
EP seats in 2014. Two new parties were also formed to contest the elections: The 
Independent Group for Change UK, consisting of a number of MPs and one MEP who had 
defected from the Conservatives and Labour due to their opposition to Brexit; and the Brexit 
Party, founded by former UKIP leader Nigel Farage as an explicitly pro-Brexit political party 
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(Helm, 2019). Turnout was 37% nationwide, a rise of 1.4% over the prior 2014 EP election 
and the second-highest turnout for EP elections in the UK (Cutts et al., 2019). This was 
below the overall average turnout of 50.66% EU-wide, and the 6th lowest national turnout.  
 
Table 1: Results of the 2014 and 2019 EP Elections in the UK by Number of MEPs Elected 
Party  MEPs elected in 2014 MEPs elected in 2019 
Conservatives 19 4 
Labour 20 10 
Green Party of England and Wales 3 7 
UKIP 24 0 
SNP 2 3 
Liberal Democrats 1 16 
Sinn Féin 1 1 
DUP 1 1 
Plaid Cymru 1 1 
UUP 1 0 
Brexit n/a 29 
Change UK n/a 0 
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland 0 1 
Source: Fella et al. (2019) 
1.1.3 The Office of MEP 
Members of European Parliament are, under normal circumstances, elected for terms of five 
years. Candidates are elected under national political party banners, but in the EP, may 
choose to organise into supranational political groups based on loose ideological 
affiliations. Multiple parties elected from the same member state may choose to sit within 
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Table 2: Political Parties Represented in the UK in the EP in 2019 by Political grouping 
Party Grouping 
Labour Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats 
Liberal Democrats, Alliance  Renew Europe 
Conservative European Conservatives and Reformists 
Sinn Féin The Left in European Parliament – 
GUE/NGL 
Green, SNP, Plaid Cymru Greens/European Free Alliance 
Brexit, DUP Non-Inscrits  
Source: Fella et al. (2019) 
MEP salaries are set at 38.5% of the basic salary of a judge at the European Court of Justice, 
currently €8,932/month (European Parliament, 2019). MEPs are also eligible for a €4576 per 
month general expenditure allowance to cover costs related to performing their 
parliamentary duties in the member state of their election, reimbursement for travel 
expenses related to their work up to €4,517, and an allowance of €324 per day while 
attending parliament. All former MEPs are entitled to an old-age pension from age 63, 
equalling 3.5% of the salary for each full year’s exercise of a mandate up to 70% (European 
Parliament, 2019). 
Until 2004 for the broader EU, and 2009 for the UK, it was legal to for a sitting MEP to sit 
simultaneously as a member of a national parliament, a practice which is known as a dual 
mandate (Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom). While this practice is outlawed, it is still 
fully legal to hold office in regional parliaments, such as the Senedd, and local government, 
such as a councillor or a mayor, at the same time as sitting as an MEP. Additionally, 
members of the House of Lords must take a leave of absence to sit in the EP, and resume 
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1.2 Research Question 
The main research question of this thesis is as follows:  
How has the political experience of MEPs elected from the United Kingdom in the 2019 
European Parliament Elections influenced the trajectories of their future careers, and to what 
extent do they remain in politics? 
In the process of answering this question, two hypotheses will also be tested: 1) That MEPs 
elected for their first term in 2019 would be less likely to go on to seek domestic office than 
incumbent MEPs 2) Brexit Party MEPs elected in 2019 would be less likely to go on to seek 
domestic political careers than MEPs from other parties. 
In addition to these, this thesis will analyse the 2019 EP election in the UK through the lens 
of Second Order election theory and explore links between MEP careers and how the EP is 
viewed as an institution by both voters and candidates. 
 
1.3 Delimitations 
The primary delimitation of this research was the relative recency of the topic, with the 2019 
UK EP election having happened only two years prior to the time of writing of this thesis. As 
such, it is impossible to confirm long term trends in career paths in such a relatively short 
period. However, between May 2019, the date of the election, and June 2021, there have 
been several opportunities for the MEPs elected in 2019 to re-enter the political arena. These 
were the 2019 UK General Election, the 2021 local body elections in England and Wales, the 
2021 regional elections to the Welsh and Scottish Parliaments and the London Assembly, as 
well as four by-elections in the House of Commons, and one by-election to the Scottish 
Parliament.  
This thesis is also limited in scope by the decision to only record data for MEPs elected in 
the 2019 EP election. While it would be academically useful to compile a data set with 
information from UK MEPs elected in previous EP elections, the amount of effort required 
would fall significantly outside the scope of this thesis project. Instead, a number of existing 
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1.4 Notes on Terminology 
The set of 73 MEPs elected to the EP by the UK in the 2019 EP will be referred to in this 
paper collectively as “the 2019 MEP cohort”, for sake of clarity and concision. 
The names House of Commons, Scottish Parliament, and Northern Irish Assembly will be 
used interchangeably with their respective metonyms: Westminster, Holyrood, and Stormont. 
The Senedd Cymru, or Welsh Parliament, will referred to as the Senedd.  
The political party Change UK was known variously across its 10-month existence as The 
Independent Group for Change, The Independent Group, Change UK – The Independent 
Group, and Change UK. In this thesis, it will be referred to exclusively as Change UK. 
The Green Party of England and Wales, Green Party Northern Ireland, and Scottish Green 
Party are independent parties, each operating exclusively in their respective regions. As only 
the Green Party of England and Wales won seats in the 2019 EP election, when this thesis 
refers to the Green Party it will be understood as referring to them.  
The Brexit Party renamed itself to Reform UK in January 2021, maintaining many of the 
same personnel and policies. As such, this thesis will use the names interchangeably as 
appropriate.  
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2. Literature Review 
This chapter will begin with an overview of literature pertaining to the categorisation of MEP 
career trajectories, followed by an examination of the findings of previous studies on MEP 
career trajectories.  It will then explain Second Order election theory, its application to the EP 
elections, and how it has been applied to MEP career paths. The chapter will conclude with a 
review of academic literature covering the 2019 EP elections in the UK. 
 
2.1 MEP Research 
2.1.1 Categorisation 
Many academics have studied the career paths of MEPs (Whitaker, 2014; Daniel, 2015; 
Daniel, 2016; Aldrich, 2018; Høyland et al., 2019). One of the first, and most prominent, works 
that attempts to categorise the role of the European Parliament in the career paths of MEPs 
was Scarrow (1997), who analysed MEP career paths as a means of determining the 
perceived power and prestige. Scarrow cross-references data on the length of tenure, and 
pre- and post-election careers from four sessions of the European Parliament, creating three 
archetypes from the resulting data. The first of these archetypes is the Domestic Careerist, 
who intends to use the European Parliament as a temporary stepping-stone to boost their 
domestic political career (Scarrow also uses this to refer to politicians holding a dual 
mandate in domestic and European parliaments, a practice since outlawed for national 
parliaments). The second archetype, the European Careerist, consists of MEPs who are 
committed to building a career within the European Parliament, and will stay in the 
parliament as long as they get re-elected. The third archetype, the Political Deadend [sic], 
refers to MEPs who do not seek re-election to the EP nor election to a domestic parliament; 
and are considered unlikely to win election to either in the future due to advanced age, over a 
decade of absence from the parliament, or death (Scarrow, 1997).  Scarrow wrote that an 
increase of European Careerist-type MEPs would indicate that more and more politicians are 
viewing the European Parliament as a worthy setting to build a long-term political career in, 
and would increase its prestige and power as an institution in comparison with other 
European and domestic institutions.    
Another scholar who contributed to the categorisation of MEP career trajectories is van 
Geffen (2016), who expanded upon Scarrow’s three archetypes of MEP careers. Van Geffen 
Page 18 of 65 
 
describes a new archetype of MEP as Former National Politicians, being politicians with 
existing domestic political careers who take up positions in the European Parliament at the 
end of their domestic careers. Van Geffen draws the distinction between these and 
Scarrow’s European Careerist class due to their political experience giving them closer ties 
to domestic politicians, aiding them in advancing to senior positions more rapidly than 
European Careerists coming in with little to no existing political experience. Van Geffen also 
expands on Scarrow’s categories by splitting the Political Deadend into two archetypes. The 
first of these is the Retiring Politician, who has domestic political experience, and takes up a 
seat in the European Parliament for one or two terms before retiring from politics. The 
second is the One-Off MEP, which are characterised by a lack of domestic political 
experience and short tenure in the European Parliament, serving only one or two terms but 
not entering domestic politics. While acknowledging the One-Off MEP archetype is a broad 
archetype and could be easily split into sub-archetypes, van Geffen argues that separating 
this archetype from retiring MEPs is justified due to the difference in motivations for 
entering the European Parliament. This expansion on Scarrow’s categorisation of MEP 
careers will be applied to the MEPs elected from the United Kingdom in 2019 for my 
research, as it presents a robust framework based on a varied dataset, as it updates 
Scarrow’s original framework based on the post Lisbon Treaty European Parliament.  
Table 3: Scarrow (1997) and van Geffen’s (2016) Five Archetypes of MEP Careers 
Archetype Name Archetype Description 
Domestic Careerist Spends short amount of time in EP, goes on to long domestic 
career 
European Careerist Spends a long time in EP, building career within EU institutions 
Former National 
Politicians 
As European Careerist, but with a long domestic career prior 
Retiring Politician Prior domestic career, short time in EP before retiring from 
politics 
One-Off MEP No prior domestic career, short time in EP, does not enter 
domestic politics after 
Source: Scarrow (1997), van Geffen (2016) 
2.1.2 Existing Studies of MEP Careers 
While there have been multiple studies on the career trajectories of politicians within the EU, 
few have focused on the European Parliament as a venue for political career development. 
While there have been studies conducted on multi-level political careers in Czechia (Bernard 
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and Safr, 2016), Germany (Borchert and Stolz, 2011), Wallonia (Dodeigne, 2014), and 
Scotland and Catalonia (Stolz, 2011), these studies focused primarily on the career 
trajectories of politicians between regional- and national-level political offices, making little 
to no reference to the European Parliament as an institution.  
It has been highlighted by many authors that the career paths of MEPs can vary, depending 
on the country they represent. Frech (2016) found that German political parties selected 
MEP candidates based on powerful, loyal candidates with national political experience; 
however, the parties did not tend to reward loyal MEPs with re-nomination for election. Real-
Dato and Alarcón-González (2012), who examined the careers of Spanish MEPs from 1986 
to 2010 before and after leaving office, found that it was most common for MEPs to have 
either no political experience (27.5%) or limited time in the national parliament (21.5%) upon 
election. Upon leaving the European Parliament, 66% of MEPs did not seek further political 
office. Furthermore, of the remaining 34% of MEPs who continue onto other political 
positions after leaving office, 69.3% of these only served one term in the European 
Parliament before moving on. They hypothesise that this indicates that the EP serves to 
provide a temporary placement before greater opportunities become available, rather than 
as a venue for gaining experience, as they found of all MEPs without prior experience who 
served a single term, only 7 out of 30 of them pursued further political office, which was 
mostly at the regional level. 
Beauvallet and Michon’s (2016) study of the career trajectories of French MEPs from 1979 
to 2014 found 28% had prior parliamentary experience, 35% had no political experience, and 
37% had experience with local politics. Of these, however, those with no political experience 
or with local experience tended to remain invested in the European Parliament over the 
course of multiple terms. Arter (2015), in a study of Finnish nominees for the European 
Parliament election of 2014 found that a surprising number of candidates were either sitting 
MPs (25%), or candidates for the prior Finnish parliamentary elections of 2011 (57%). This 
surprising amount of national commitment of national talent to the European Parliament 
was attributed to the desire to run candidates with existing name recognition in electorates 
in order to attract votes.  
Bíró-Nagy’s (2019) study of the political background of MEPs elected the 2004 and 2011 EP 
elections in 5 Central European nations which joined the EU in 2004 (Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, and Hungary) provides insight into the use of national 
parliaments as recruitment grounds for EP candidacy. This study found that a greater 
percentage of MEPs elected by these countries had experience in their national parliaments, 
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ranging from 50% in Poland to 71.4% in Slovakia for the 2004 EP election, compared to the 
overall number of MEPs with domestic experience being 39% that election.  
 
2.2 The European Parliament as a Second Order Election 
Many scholars have defined the role of the European Parliament elections in the context of 
domestic voting patterns as being a second order election (Hix and Marsh, 2007, Prosser, 
2016, Willermain, 2014, Hausemer, 2006, Hix and Marsh, 2011). Reif and Schmitt (1980) 
used the second order framework to discuss the European Parliament elections due to their 
perceived lack of impact on their electorate. First order elections are those which are seen 
as being most important due to the significance of their outcomes. In most Western 
democracies, these are the parliamentary elections, and where applicable, the presidential 
elections. In first order elections, the main factor influencing voters is the direct outcome of 
the election. This stands in contrast to second order elections, where voters are less 
influenced by the direct outcome of the vote due to its reduced scope, but also by the 
political factors and context of the primary political arena. This may lead to voters being 
more open to voting for smaller or newer parties, either because there is less at stake or as a 
protest vote against the agenda of the national government.   
Since the first European Parliament election, its position as a second order election has been 
cemented by a gradual decrease of voter turnout, despite the gradual empowerment of the 
European Parliament theoretically strengthening the relevancy of the Parliament as an 
electoral arena (Corbett, 2014). In the 2014 elections, an agreement called the 
spitzenkandidat, or lead candidate, was implemented. Through this, each European political 
party would put forward a nominee for the President of the European Commission. This, 
combined with a series of televised debates between each candidate, intended to provide 
voters a greater opportunity to influence the European Union, increasing their importance 
and therefore voter turnout. However, this did not appear to be a major influence on voter 
turnout, with only 5% of voters listing the spitzenkandidat process as motivating them to 
vote in the elections (Willermain, 2014). While turnout dropped in 2014 from 2009, it was 
only a drop of .5%, being the smallest drop in turnout between European Parliament 
elections since 1984-89, thus demonstrating the impact of the attempts to shift the 
perception of the European Parliament elections from a second order to a first order election 
on voting habits.   
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However, some recent studies on the topic of the topic of voter patterns in the European 
Parliament elections dispute the second order hypothesis, arguing that while domestic 
issues have some level of influence on voting patterns, European policy concerns have also 
been influential in deciding voter behaviour (Ferrara and Weishaupt, 2004, Carrubba, 2005).  
in their analysis of the 2019 European Parliament election, Galpin and Trenz (2019) argue 
that the European elections have shifted from being second-order national elections, to 
“first-order polity” elections. Galpin and Trenz argue this change has occurred as the primary 
issues being debated in the election are regarding the legitimacy of the European Union as 
an institution itself. They argue that as the campaigns were fought more on EU-specific 
topics such as the European values of gender equality in the European constitution, and the 
future of integration, as opposed to being primarily focused on the policies and performance 
of the European parties. This shift towards becoming first order polity is argued to be 
caused not by any conscious effort by the European Parliament; in fact, Galpin and Trenz 
point to the domination of traditional and social media channels by figures like Matteo 
Salvini and Guy Verhofstadt as undermining the official Spitzenkandidaten process 
championed by the EU. 
The effect European Union elections status as second order elections on the selection of 
political candidates has been studied by Hobolt and Høyland (2011). Their research looked 
at the relation between political experience in candidates nominated by parties, and their 
political success in the European Parliament elections. In a first order election, voters can 
vote with the intention to hold the government to account. However, in a second order 
election, it becomes harder to monitor the performance of the incumbent, as their political 
actions are less visible. Additionally, due to the structure of the European Parliament 
compared to a conventional parliament, there is no government to hold to account, further 
obscuring the impact of voting. Therefore, voters in second order elections such as the 
European Parliament may choose to vote based on the political competence of candidates. 
Using political experience as a proxy for competence, Hobolt and Høyland argue that voter 
patterns in the European Parliament elections is influenced strongly by the political 
experience of the candidate being run, in addition to the performance of the incumbent 
government, suggesting that parties could mitigate losses in European Parliament elections 
somewhat by running more experienced candidates. In addition, their study found that the 
effect of running experienced candidates in a European Parliament election was influenced 
by the timing of the election compared to the first order national elections. European 
Parliament elections being held at the midpoint between two national elections were found 
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to correlate with experienced candidates performing better when compared to European 
Parliament elections held closer to national elections.   
The status of the 2019 European Parliament elections as either second-order national 
elections, or as first order polity elections, as well as how this is reflected on the selection of 
candidates and their political experience will be discussed in this thesis.  
 
2.3 The 2019 European Parliament Election in the UK 
Due to the recency of the 2019 European Parliament election, only limited literature has been 
published on the election, and very little of that covers the election in the United Kingdom. 
Three articles focusing specifically on the elections in the UK were found, Vasilopoulou 
(2020), Cutts et al. (2019), and Martill (2020). These articles provide solid overviews of the 
electoral factors surrounding the election, as well as voter behaviour and trends compared 
to the 2017 general election and 2014 EP elections.  
While one paper on the results of the 2019 EP election in Northern Ireland exists (Haughey 
and Pow, 2020), the prominence of the unionism versus republicanism electoral cleavage 
means that the findings of this paper are not easily applicable to the rest of the United 
Kingdom. Other articles focusing on the 2019 EP election, such as Galpin and Trenz (2019), 
were also found. These articles are useful for providing greater context for the election, 
although they do not focus on the unique circumstances of the election in the UK, instead 
discussing broader election trends EU-wide. 
Similarly, due to recency issues, little literature exists on the Brexit Party, the newly formed 
political party that won a plurality of the British seats in the 2019 European Parliament 
election, although several papers exist discussing the United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP). UKIP can be considered the predecessor party to the Brexit party, due to their 
continuity in leadership and policy (Tournier-Sol, 2020), and although both participated in the 
2019 European Parliament elections, nearly all the support base of UKIP switched to the 
Brexit party. In both the 2009 and 2014 European Parliament elections, UKIP attracted voters 
who were dissatisfied with the incumbent governments, but also attracted a large voter base 
primarily concerned with European-level policies, with particular support based on the issue 
of immigration (Treib, 2014). This was particularly evident in the 2009 European Parliament 
election, where over half of UKIP’s voter turnout came from voters who would normally vote 
for the Conservative Party, but voted UKIP to express their dissatisfaction with their stance 
on European integration (Ford et al., 2012).  
Page 23 of 65 
 
 
2.4 Literature Gaps 
After conducting a review on literature related to this thesis topic, the primary gap in existing 
literature detected is surrounding the 2019 European Parliament Election, due to the recency 
of the election. While literature on past elections and the career paths of MEPs elected 
therein is still useful from a theoretical standpoint, the unique circumstances of the election 
in the UK will need to be accounted for when using these articles. For similar reasons, 
relatively little literature exists on the Brexit Party, as the party was founded in 2019 to 
contest the elections in the United Kingdom. Literature on UKIP, their predecessor party, has 
relevance to the topic due to their similarities, but the differences between the two and the 
contexts of the different elections they contested should be accounted for when discussing 
them. Additionally, no literature looking specifically at the candidates selected by either UKIP 
or the Brexit Party was found. This is not a major setback as theory on the topic of candidate 
selection should be broadly applicable.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This literature review provides an overview of academic literature on the topic of the career 
paths of Members of European Parliament, and first/second order theory and its application 
to the European Parliament elections. The career paths of MEPs is a topic which has been 
covered by several prominent scholars  (Whitaker, 2014; Daniel, 2015; Daniel, 2016; Aldrich, 
2018), covering aspects including pre-election careers and political experience, post-election 
career prospects, national trends, and the role of experience in re-election. Scarrow (1997) 
and van Geffen (2016) provide a framework for categorising the career trajectories of MEPs 
based on their experience on entering parliament, and their career choices after leaving 
parliament.  
The theory of second order elections has been applied to the European Parliament elections 
by many scholars (Hix and Marsh, 2007; Prosser, 2016; Willermain, 2014; Hausemer, 2006; 
Hix and Marsh, 2011). The majority of scholars view voting patterns in the European 
Parliament elections as motivated by punishing domestic governments as opposed to voting 
on European policy issues. This was evidenced in the 2014 and 2009 elections in the United 
Kingdom, with voters who would have normally voted for the Conservative Party opting to 
vote for UKIP to express their dissatisfaction on Conservative European policy (Ford et al., 
2012). This trend was amplified in the 2019 EP election, with former UKIP and some pro-
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Brexit Conservative and Labour voters voting for the Brexit Party, and pro-Remain voters 
voting for the Liberal Democrats and Greens However, it is possible that the 2019 European 
Parliament elections could be considered first order elections due to the prominence of 
European level issues being debated (Galpin and Trenz 2019). 
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
This chapter outlines the methodology used when gathering data on the careers of the 2019 
MEP cohort. An overview of the types of sources used to compile the dataset is provided, as 
well as talking about the difficulties encountered gathering this data. It details the categories 
of data recorded on the career paths taken by the cohort pre- and post-election, and how 
these will be sorted using Scarrow and van Geffen’s MEP career archetypes. 
3.1 Gathering Data 
Information gathered was limited to the 73 MEPs who were elected by the UK in the 2019 EP 
election. The party affiliation of MEPs was recorded primarily as per their affiliation at time 
of election instead of at time of their expulsion. While some MEPs switched their party 
affiliation midway through their term in office, this was recorded separately from their 
affiliation at election, as this thesis is concerned primarily with their status at election, as 
post-election changes in party affiliation occurred independently of voter behaviour in the 
election. However, as this presents a variation in a subsection of MEPs, it warrants 
examination to determine if it had a notable effect on the career path of these MEPs, 
compared to those who maintained their party affiliation. Additionally, one SNP MEP, 
Heather Anderson was appointed to the EP four days prior to the withdrawal of the UK from 
the EU, taking the seat vacated by Alyn Smith, who was elected MP for Stirling in the 2019 
General Election (Davidson, 2019). The case of Anderson has been excluded from this study 
due to her appointment to the EP as opposed to election, and her unusually short tenure as 
MEP. 
In gathering data on the career paths of the 2019 MEP cohort, a variety of online sources, 
both primary and secondary have been used. Primary sources used include LinkedIn 
accounts, personal websites, official party biographies, and other social media accounts 
operated by the MEPs in question. LinkedIn in particular proved to be a valuable source of 
data on the careers of the MEPs, as users of the site may choose to display a chronological 
list of their current and past employment, and as such takes precedent in cases where 
conflicting information was found. Secondary sources used include news articles, press 
statements, and journal articles. For gathering data on some topics, including basic 
biographical facts such as age, Wikipedia was used as a primary reference. In cases where 
one source did not provide full information, e.g., only providing information on a MEP’s 
career prior to election, multiple sources were used where possible. All data used was 
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gathered from sources which were publicly available; while LinkedIn pages are not visible 
without possessing a LinkedIn account, the accounts cited here were set to publicly visible 
and as such can be considered publicly available. As this is publicly available data, it did not 
require approval from the UC Ethics Committee. Data collected from these sources was 
compiled into a spreadsheet. The individual sources used to compile this data are listed in 
this thesis in Appendix 1. 
Compared to previous academic studies on the career paths of MEPs, the process of 
gathering this data faced significant challenges. Other studies which have examined the 
career paths of MEPs have been able to access data from a variety of sources including 
surveys of MEPs run by both the EU and academics, interviews with individual MEPs, or the 
official EP website’s “Your MEPs” section. However, none of these were viable for this 
thesis: I had no access to any surveys which were recent enough to contain relevant 
information, I did not have enough time to conduct the necessary number of interviews for a 
viable sample size, and while the EP database of MEPs contains curricula vitae of incumbent 
MEPs who choose to volunteer the data, it does not retain this data for MEPs who have left 
office. However, the disclosure of financial interest of each MEP is accessable, which aided 
in researching the occupations directly prior to their election. As such, it was necessary to 
conduct my own research, which draws upon a number of disparate sources to examine the 
career trajectories of the 2019 MEP cohort.  
Another challenge unique to this study is that as the 2019 MEP cohort are no longer in office, 
many of their official websites and social media accounts, especially those without prior 
political experience or current office, have been removed from the internet since they have 
left office, presenting a further challenge to gathering data. Similarly, while LinkedIn was my 
preferred source of career data, not every MEP has an account, and while many former 
MEPs continue to update their LinkedIn accounts with their post-office endeavours, a 
number have neglected to continue to do so, erroneously identifying themselves as an 
incumbent MEP. In such circumstances, I have endeavoured to find a second source 
confirming their current occupation.  
 
3.2 Data Collected 
3.2.1 Pre-Election Data 
To create a full dataset that would enable a full examination of the career paths of the 2019 
MEP cohort, a selection of demographics was recorded for each MEP. First, basic 
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information was recorded: their name, the political party they were elected under, that party’s 
EP political group, and which electorate they represented. Then, information on their 
activities before they were elected MEP was recorded. This included their highest elected 
office held before election, or if they had been an unsuccessful candidate for any office. The 
hierarchy used to determine the highest elected office was as follows: Life Peer > MP > MEP 
> MLA/MSP/AM/AS > Mayor > Councillor > Candidate for any of the above positions. In 
cases where the office of MEP was the highest achieved office of an incumbent, it was only 
recorded as such if they had sat non-consecutive terms as an MEP e.g., been elected or 
appointed, lost re-election, then been elected again in the 2019 election. All unsuccessful 
bids for any of the above positions were also recorded. The incumbency status of MEPs was 
also recorded, as well as the year they were elected to the office of MEP. For political parties 
with more than one MEP, who either have a formal European Parliament Leader position or 
the leader of their party as an MEP, the leader of the party was also marked separately to 
investigate whether this had a notable impact on their careers. The age and gender of every 
MEP was recorded, with age being recorded as of time of election.  
The occupation held by each MEP immediately prior to their election was also recorded. This 
information was recorded in a way in which considered political office to take precedence 
over other occupations, specifically the office of councillor. Being a councillor is not a full-
time position, and the fiscal compensation varies between country: £14,218 in Wales, 
£14,000 in Northern Ireland, and  £18,604 in Scotland (Prestron, 2018, Scottish Government, 
n.d., Welsh Government, n.d.). In England, councillors do not receive a salary, although they 
are entitled to a basic allowance, the amount of which varies between councils (Local 
Government Association, 2021). While this is not a full-time occupation, and many 
councillors have other occupations as primary income sources, being a councillor will take 
precedence in reporting due to the focus of this thesis on political careers.  
These points of data collected present a comprehensive image of the political careers and 
experiences of the 2019 MEP cohort prior to their election. It allows for an examination of 
their background prior to seeking office, and the extent of their prior political experience. 
3.2.2 Post-Election Data 
Details of the political careers of MEPs after they had been elected was also gathered, as 
part of assessing the role which serving in the EP has played in their future careers. This 
included what further political offices each MEP runs for after being elected. As mentioned 
above, the elections which occurred between the EP election in May 2019 and June 2021:  
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the 2019 UK General Election, the 2021 local body elections in England and Wales, the 2021 
regional elections to the Welsh and Scottish Parliaments and the London Assembly, as well 
as four by-elections in the House of Commons, and one by-election to the Scottish 
Parliament. This includes the period in which they were actively sitting in the EP, as it is 
possible to stand for election in a national or regional parliament while sitting as an MEP, 
although in the event that an MEP wins election to a national parliament, they are required to 
abdicate their EP seat due to the dual mandate laws.  
The occupation of each MEP was also recorded after they left office. Similar to the 
methodology used for recording occupation prior to entering office, political appointments 
such as councillor were recorded as taking precedence over other occupations in situations 
where a former MEP held both. In addition, this was extended to cover appointments to 
internal political party positions, such as leadership or advisor roles. While these positions 
may not be a full-time occupation, as they are directly tied to involvement with political 
parties, they present an opportunity to examine political careers and as such are included. 
 
3.3 Mapping Data to Scarrow and van Geffen’s MEP Archetypes 
To aid in mapping the career paths of the 2019 MEP cohort to Scarrow and van Geffen’s 
archetypes of MEP careers, a list of these archetypes and the exact criteria used in this 
thesis to assign these archetypes to MEPs will be provided. In these archetypes, being 
appointed to replace a resigning MEP is considered the same as being elected, as due to the 
list system used to elect MEPs, when an MEP resigns mid-term, they are replaced with the 
next candidate on the list. As this required an (initially unsuccessful) run for office, it can be 
considered a successful attempt at getting elected. 
1. European Careerist – Defined by Scarrow as “[MEPs] who show a long and primary 
commitment to their European jobs … who served for at least eight years in the 
elected European Parliament without winning a new national legislative seat”. For 
purposes of this thesis, a European Careerist will be considered someone who has 
been in the EP prior to 2014, without any prior political experience greater than local 
government. This includes MEPs who have served non-consecutive terms in office, 
but excludes MEPs elected in for the first time 2014.  
 
2. Domestic Careerist – Defined by Scarrow as “those who use their seats as stepping-
stones for winning (or regaining) national political office… who won national 
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legislative seats in domestic elections after their initial election to the European 
Parliament.” For purposes of this thesis, MEPs who have been elected for the first 
time in 2014 or later, who have since run for office in any other political office that 
they did not hold concurrently with their time as MEP (e.g., not a councillor position) 
will be considered a Domestic Careerist.  
 
3. Former National Politician – Defined by van Geffen as  “politicians who have already 
had a career at national level, either as an MP or a member of government, whose 
political life at national level has come to an end. For these politicians, a career in the 
EP has now become an interesting alternative.” For purposes of this thesis, a Former 
National Politician will be considered any MEP who has held office greater than 
councillor prior to election, and who was elected before 2014.  
 
4. Retiring Politician – Defined by van Geffen as “MEPs over the age of 60 who had a 
career in domestic politics prior to their election as an MEP”. For the purposes of this 
thesis, any MEP over the age of 60 with political experience above the office of 
councillor elected in 2014 or later will be considered a Retiring Politician.  
 
5. One Off Politician – Defined by van Geffen as “not typically hav[ing] a domestic 
political career either before or after his time in the EP, and typically stay[ing] in the 
EP for two terms at most.” For the purposes of this thesis, any MEP with no political 
experience above the rank of Councillor who was elected in 2014 or later and did not 
go on to seek political office will be considered a One-Off Politician. 
 
6. Other – MEPs whose political careers do not fit into the above categories will be 
recorded separately. 
 










4.1 Observation of Trends 
This section of the findings will identify and examine overall trends found within the dataset 
assembled, including gender, age, offices held before election, and elections contested after 
leaving office. Where applicable, statistics for other UK-wide elections have been provided.  
4.1.1 Gender 
Of the 73 MEPs elected in the 2019 cohort, 34 were female, or 46%. None of the MEPs 
elected from the UK in 2019 were transgender, nonbinary, or otherwise gender 
nonconforming. This percentage of female MEPs was an increase compared to the 2014 EP 
election, where the UK elected 30 female MEPs, or 41% of the total delegation (Raibagi, 
2019). This compares favourably to the overall EP numbers, which as of the 2019 EP 
election was 40% female, or 308 of the 751 MEPs. Both the UK and overall EP fall within the 
ratio of between 40 to 60 percent female representation set by the European Institute for 
Gender Equality to promote gender equality (Pavone, 2019). Compared to individual EU 
member states, the UK had the tenth highest percentage of female MEPs, with the highest 
being Finland at 54% female MEPs, and the lowest being Cyprus, which elected zero female 
MEPs. Another comparison can be drawn to the 2017 UK general election, which elected 650 
MPs, 208 of which were female, or 32% (Pilling and Cracknell, 2021). In the 2019 UK general 
election, this number increased to 220 female MPs, or 34%. 
Table 4: Number of Female Parliamentarians Elected in UK-wide Elections 
Election UK EP 2014 UK EP 2019 EU EP 2019 UK GE 2017 UK GE 2019 
Female Elected 30 34 308 208 220 
Total Elected 73 73 751 650 650 
Percentage Female 41% 46% 40% 32% 34% 
Source: Author’s Own Research, Raibagi (2019), Pilling and Cracknell (2021) 
The party with the largest number of female MEPs elected in 2019 was the Liberal 
Democrats, with 9 of their 16 MEPs being female. The parties with the largest percentage of 
female MEPs were the Alliance, DUP, Plaid Cymru, and Sinn Féin, all of which elected 100% 
female MEPs, although they each elected only a single MEP. The party with multiple MEPs 
with the largest percentage of female MEPs was the Green Party, with 71% of their MEPs 
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being female. The party with the lowest percentage of female MEPs was the Brexit Party, 
with 28% of their MEPs being female, or 8 out of their 29 MEPs. The Brexit Party and the SNP 
were the only two parties to elect under 50% female MEPs.  
Table 5: Number of Female Members of European Parliament Elected in 2019 by Party 




Female MEP as 
Percentage 
Brexit 8 29 28% 
Liberal 
Democrats 
9 16 56% 
Labour 5 10 50% 
Greens 5 7 71% 
Conservative 2 4 50% 
SNP 1 3 33% 
Other 4 4 100% 
Total 34 73 46% 
Source: Author’s Own Research 
 
4.1.2 Age 
The average age of the 2019 MEP cohort at the time of the 2019 EP election was 53 years 
old. The youngest MEP elected, Lucy Harris (Brexit) was 28 when she took office, with the 
oldest MEP, Bill Newton Dunn (LD) being 78. The political party with the highest average age 
was the Conservative Party, with an average age of 62. The political party with more than a 
single MEP with the lowest average age was both the SNP and the Green Party, with an 
average age of 48 each. In comparison, the average age of MPs elected in the 2017 general 
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Table 6: Average Age At Election of MEPs at Elected in 2019 By Political Party 







Liberal Democrat 56 
Plaid Cymru* 60 
SNP 48 
Sinn Féin* 57 
Total 53 
Source: Author’s Own Research. Note: Parties with a single MEP marked with * 
When sorted into age categories spanning 10 years each, the largest age category for the 
2019 cohort was between 50-59, with 26 MEPs, or 35%, falling into this bracket. This age 
category was also the same for MPs elected in the 2019 general election, however, the 
second largest age category for these MPs was 40-49, whereas the 2019 MEP cohort had 
60-69 as its second largest age category.  
Table 7: Ages of MEPs Elected in 2019 and MPs Elected in 2019 by Age Bracket 
Age Category MEPs elected in 2019 As % of total MPs elected in 2019 As % of total 
18-29 1 1% 21 3% 
30-39 10 14% 109 17% 
40-49 14 19% 183 28% 
50-59 26 35% 195 30% 
60-69 18 25% 106 16% 
70+ 4 5% 21 3% 
Not Specified - - 16 2% 
Total 73 100% 650 100% 
Source: Author’s Own Research, Pilling and Cracknell (2021) 
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4.1.3 Political Experience Prior to Election as MEP 
Of the 73 members of the 2019 MEP cohort, only 9 of them had held a regional or national 
political office prior to their election. Of these, 3 had served as MPs, 3 as MLAs, and 3 as 
MSPs. 4 had been elected as MEPs prior to their current term on non-consecutive 
occasions. Of the rest, 21 had been elected to positions in local government. 18 held the 
office of councillor as their highest elected role, as well as 1 mayor, 1 deputy mayor, and 1 
lord mayor. 1 MEP sat as a Lord Temporal prior to election. Of the remaining 38 MEPs, 14 of 
them had unsuccessfully ran for either regional or national office prior to becoming an MEP. 
The other 24 MEPs had zero experience serving in political office prior to their election as 
MEP.  
Table 8: Highest Political Experience prior to Election as MEP by Party 
Party MP Lord MLA MSP MEP Local 
Govt. 
Candidate None Total 
Alliance 1 - - - - - - - 1 
Brexit 1 - - 1 - 3 7 17 29 
Conservative - 1 - - - - 1 2 4 
DUP - - 1 - - - - - 1 
Green - - - - - 6 1 - 7 
Labour - - - - 2 3 1 4 10 
LD 2 - - - 2 8 3 1 16 
PC - - - - - 1 - - 1 
SNP - - - 2 - - 1 - 3 
SF - - 1 - - - - - 1 
Total 4 1 2 3 4 21 14 24 73 
Source: Author’s Own Research 
Of the 73 members of the 2019 MEP cohort, 22 of the MEPs were incumbents who won re-
election in the 2019 EP election. 49 won election to the EP for the first time in 2019. 2 MEPs 
had served as MEPs prior to the 2014 election where they lost their seats but were returned 
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4.1.4 Political Experience After Leaving the European Parliament 
Of the 73 members of the 2019 MEP cohort, 15 ran for another political office at the regional 
or national level after being elected to the EP. 10 of these runs for election were in the 2019 
general election. The other 7 were in the 2021 regional elections: 2 were to the Scottish 
Parliament, 2 were to the London Assembly, 2 were to the Senedd, and 1 was for the 
Mayoralty of London. Additionally, three MEPs who stood in the 2019 GE stood for regional 
offices: 2 to the Senedd, and 2 to the London Assembly. All but one of these runs for office 
were unsuccessful, the sole successful MEP being Alan Smyth (SNP), who won election to 
the electorate of Stirling in the 2019 general election. Additionally, 2 MEPs were nominated 
as Life Peers to the House of Lords following their departure from the EP. 
Table 9: Election Attempts Made by MEPs post-election per party 
Party Westminster Holyrood Senedd London Assembly Total 
Alliance - - - - - 
Brexit 6 - 2 2 10 
Conservative - - - - - 
DUP - - - - - 
Green 4 - - - 4 
Labour - - 1 - 1 
LD - 1 - 1 2 
PC - - - - - 
SNP 1 1 - - 2 
SF 1 - - - 1 
Total 12 2 3 4 20 
Source: Authors’ Own Research. NOTE: the 4 MEPs who ran for two races post-election are counted twice. Luisa 
Porrit (LD)’s run for London Mayor has been listed under London Assembly. 
 
4.2 Scarrow and van Geffen Archetype Findings 
This section will contain analysis of the findings of the research on the career paths of the 
2019 MEP cohort, using the above criteria to sort them into archetypes based on their career 
trajectories before, during, and after leaving office. Each individual archetype will be 
analysed individually, with two case studies of individual MEPs conducted per each 
archetype. These case studies provide in depth examples of each archetype, allowing for a 
thorough examination of the MEPs who fit into each archetype and why they are classified 
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as such. The MEPs selected will be, where possible, one female and one male, and one each 
from pro- and anti-Brexit parties, with an attempt made to feature at least one MEP of every 
party which elected more than one MEP in 2019. A party being anti-Brexit will be defined as 
parties whose MEPs signed the Brussels Declaration: The Labour Party, the Green Party, the 
Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru, the SNP, and Alliance (Stone, 2019). Pro-Brexit parties will 
be considered those who did not sign the Brussels Declaration. 
The three MEPs elected in Northern Ireland will be discussed in a separate section, owing to 
the unique political scenario in Northern Ireland compared to the rest of the UK, and their 
unique career trajectories. As in Scarrow’s original study, a section for MEPs whose career 
paths fall outside the archetypes will be included. All sources used to write the case studies 
can be found under the respective MEP’s entry in Appendix 1.  
 













Alliance - - - - - 1 1 
Brexit 1 5 - 1 21 1 29 
Conservative 3 - - - - 1 4 
DUP - - 1 - - - 1 
Green - 4 - - 3 - 7 
Labour 3 1 - - 6 - 10 
Liberal 
Democrat 
3 2 1 - 9 1 16 
Plaid Cymru 1 - - - - - 1 
SNP 1 - - - - 2 3 
Sinn Féin  - - 1 - - - 1 
Total 12 12 3 1 39 6 73 
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4.2.1 European Careerists 
European Careerists are MEPS who have committed themselves to a political career with a 
commitment to the EP as the primary arena. Of the 2019 MEP cohort, 12 were European 
Careerists. 9 of these MEPs were incumbents; two Liberal Democrat MEPs, Phil Bennion and 
Bill Newton Dunn, had sat in the EP, lost their seats in the 2014 EP election, then been re-
elected in 2019. Similarly, Labour MEP Neena Gill was elected in 1999, lost her seat in the 
2009 election, then was re-elected in 2014. Of these 12 MEPs, only two of them had been 
successfully elected to office before being elected to the EP: Jill Evans (PC) and Catherine 
Bearder (LD), both of whom had served as councillors. Asides from these, 4 of these MEPs 
had unsuccessfully run for national or regional office prior to being elected as an MEP. Ages 
of these MEPs ranged between Of this group of MEPs, only one ran for office after election, 
Alyn Smith (SNP) who ran in the 2019 General Election. Notably, Smith is the only MEP out of 
the entire 2019 cohort to successfully win election to another political office. Additionally, 
Daniel Hannan (Cons.) was appointed to the House of Lords as a Lord Temporal after 
leaving office. Also of note is that of all parties which have a formal leader of their EP 
delegation (Brexit, Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat), this office was held by a 
European Careerist, in addition to the sole Plaid Cymru MEP. 
 
4.2.1.2 Case Studies: Nigel Farage (Brexit), Catherine Bearder (LD) 
Nigel Farage (Male, age 55) was first elected to the EP in 1999 in the constituency of South 
East England as a member of UKIP. He became the leader of this party from 2006 to 2009, 
and then again from 2010 to 2019. He left the party in 2018 and went on to found the Brexit 
Party in 2019, which he led until 2021. Prior to his election to the EP, he worked as a 
commodities trader, having unsuccessfully ran for national office twice, in the 1997 General 
Election and in the 1994 by-election in the constituency of Eastleigh, as well as an 
unsuccessful run in the 1994 EP election. Notably, and somewhat irregularly for a sitting 
MEP, he ran for national office multiple time while sitting as an MEP, in the general elections 
of 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010, and 2015, as well as the 2006 by-election in the constituency of 
Bromley and Chislehurst, all of which were unsuccessful. After leaving office, Farage 
resigned as leader of the Brexit Party, now renamed to Reform UK, and was appointed to the 
board of the Dutch Green Business Group. Although his numerous attempts at election to 
Westminster may not necessarily be indicative of a commitment to European politics, 
Farage’s long career in the EP qualifies him as a European Careerist. 
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Catherine Bearder (Female, age 70) was first elected to the EP in 2009 in the constituency of 
South East England as a member of the Liberal Democrats. In 2014 she was the sole Liberal 
Democrat MEP in the EP, becoming their de facto leader, a position which was formalised 
after the 2019 EP election in which the Liberal Democrats elected 16 MEPs. Additionally, 
from 2014 to 2019, she served as a Quaestor of the European Parliament, an administrative 
position within the EP appointed by the President and Vice Presidents of the European 
Parliament. Prior to her election, she had run for office three times: once in the EP election in 
1999, and twice in the 1997 and 2001 general elections. She had also sat as a councillor on 
the Oxfordshire County Council prior to her election. Immediately prior to her election as 
MEP, she worked as a constituency organiser for the Liberal Democrats. After she left office, 
she became a trustee for the International Fund for Animal Welfare, an animal rights non-
profit, and a member of the council of Unlock Democracy, a political advocacy group against 
human trafficking. The length of her tenure qualifies her as a European Careerist; 
additionally, her appointment as Quaestor serves as a further indicator for her commitment 
to building her political career within the institutions of the EU. 
 
4.2.2 Domestic Careerists 
Domestic Careerists are MEPs who use a short time in the EP as a launching point for a 
career in domestic politics, which they intend to make the main arena for their political 
career. Of the 2019 MEP cohort, 12 fall under the classification of domestic careerists, as 
they came into the EP with no prior domestic political experience, served less than eight 
years, before attempting to run for a domestic office. Of the 12 Domestic Careerists, 6 held 
positions in local governance before being elected as MEP: five councillors and one mayor. 
These 6 MEPs with experience also made up the entirety of the Green and Liberal Democrat 
Domestic Careerist MEPs. Additionally, only four candidates had had unsuccessful runs at 
office prior to their election, three of which were Green MEPs, the other being Brexit Party 
MEP David Gill. All but two of the domestic careerists were elected in the 2019 EP election. 
By definition, every Domestic Careerist ran for office after being elected to the EP. Of the 
offices sought, the majority of them were for Westminster in the 2019 General Election, with 
8 of these MEPs standing. Notably, these were all 4 Green MEPs and all but one Brexit MEP 
from this category, although two of the Brexit party MEPs were candidates for regional 
parliamentary elections in 2021 in addition to their general election runs. Two Brexit MEPs 
stood for the London Assembly, one Brexit and the single Labour MEP stood for the Senedd, 
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one Liberal Democrat stood for the Scottish Parliament, and one Liberal Democrat ran for 
the London mayoralty. None of the MEPs from the domestic careerist archetype were 
successful in their post-EP election bids. However, five of this archetype went on to assume 
non-elected roles in political parties after leaving office. Molly Scott Cato (Green) became an 
internal party spokesperson for the Greens, Richard Tice, Nathan Gill and David Bull (Brexit) 
were appointed Leader of Reform UK, Leader of the Reform UK Wales party and Deputy 
Leader of Reform UK respectively, and Martin Daubney became Deputy Leader of the newly 
formed Reclaim Party.  
  
4.2.2.1 Case Studies: Richard Tice (Brexit) and Jackie Jones (Labour) 
Richard Tice (Male, aged 49) was elected MEP under the Brexit Party for East of England in 
the 2019 EP election. Although he had not ran for any form of political office prior to 
becoming an MEP, he was a director of the Business for Sterling campaign, a campaign to 
prevent the UK adopting the Euro; co-founded Leave.EU in 2015, a pro-Brexit campaign 
group; and founded Leave Means Leave in 2016, a group advocating a no-deal Brexit. Tice 
was also appointed as Chairman of the Brexit Party in April 2019. After leaving the EP, he 
unsuccessfully ran in the 2021 London Assembly elections in the Havering and Redbridge 
constituency, coming 5th.  Tice was selected as Leader of the Reform Party in March 2021. 
Prior to his term as MEP, he was CEO of Quidnet Capital LLC, a position which he maintained 
during and after his term as MEP. Tice’s run for the London Assembly, and his ascension to 
party leader after leaving office, as well as his lack of electoral history prior, marks him as a 
Domestic Careerist. 
Jackie Jones (Female, 53) was elected MEP under the Labour Party for Wales in 2019. 
Jones had no prior experience with political office prior to election to the EP. At time of 
election, she volunteered as President of the NGO European Women Lawyers Association, 
and as chair of the NGO Wales Assembly of Women. Professionally, she was a professor of 
Feminist Legal Studies at the University of West England prior to her election. After leaving 
office, Jones unsuccessfully ran in the 2021 Senedd election for the seat of Preseli 
Pembrokeshire. She became an advisor for Labour for a European Future in 2021, a Labour 
party organisation promoting relations with the EU. Due to Jones’s attempt to take office 
after her short period in the EP, she can be classified as a Domestic Careerist. 
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4.2.3 One Off MEPs 
One Off MEPs, who had no political experience above local politics, stayed in the EP for two 
terms or fewer, and did not seek further office, were by far the largest demographic 
represented in the 2019 MEP cohort, at 39 of the cohort of 73, or 54%. Of all of the One Off 
MEPs, 10 of them sat in local political offices immediately prior to election, all sitting as 
councillors with the exception of Green MEP Magid Magid, who was simultaneously Lord 
Mayor of Sheffield (An elected but honorary title). Four additional MEPs had been councillors 
prior to election but were not incumbent at time of election. 18 of these MEPs had made 
unsuccessful runs for office before being elected to the EP. Notably, all but one of these had 
unsuccessfully ran for seats in Westminster, as well as 5 unsuccessful attempts to enter the 
EP, but not a single One Off MEP had run for office at the regional level.  
As per the criteria established by van Geffen, MEPs who were elected for the first time in the 
2014 EP election onwards are categorised as One Off MEPs. However, while the majority of 
these One Off MEPs were elected in 2019, 7 of them were either elected in the 2014 EP 
election or had stood in the 2014 EP election but were appointed to fill vacancies made by 
MEPs stepping down. Of particular interest is that of these 7 MEPs, 6 of them were from the 
Labour Party, making up the entirety of their One Off MEP cohort. The other of these MEPs 
was Jonathan Bullock, a Brexit Party MEP who had switched affiliation from UKIP. While the 
MEPs elected in 2019 had no realistic prospects of building a career in the EP due to the 
reality of the UK’s imminent withdrawal, it is possible the MEPs elected in 2014 came into 
office with the intent of building a career there, and therefore present a noteworthy 
subsection of the One Off archetype. 
Another subsection of the One Off archetype are MEPs who, either voluntarily resigned from 
the Brexit Party, or were expelled from the party. These MEPs consisted of Annunziata Rees-
Mogg, Lance Forman, Lucy Harris, who resigned to join the Conservative Party, Louis 
Stedman-Bryce who resigned to sit as an independent, John Longworth who was expelled 
and sat with the Conservative Party, and Andrew England Kerr who was expelled and sat as 
an independent. All of these MEPs fall under the One Off Archetype, as they had no 
experience holding political office prior to election, and did not pursue office after leaving, 
but their experience as switching party allegiance mid-term marks them as a noteworthy 
subsection of the One Off archetype.  
After leaving office, none of the One Off MEPs sought further political office. However, one 
Brexit Party MEP, Claire Fox, was appointed as a Lord Temporal after leaving office. Also of 
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note is that one Brexit Party MEP, Robert Rowland, died in a scuba accident after leaving 
office. 
4.2.3.1 Case Studies: Alexandra Phillips (Brexit) and Magid Magid (Green) 
Alexandra Phillips (Female, 35) was elected in 2019 for the Brexit Party in South East 
England. Formerly a journalist for ITV and BBC Wales, Phillips worked for UKIP as head of 
media, as well as working as a consultant for SCL Group, which worked on media 
consultations for the 2017 Kenyan election. Immediately prior to election, she worked as a 
media advisor for then-UKIP MEP and AM Nathan Gill, who would also later go on to join the 
Brexit Party. After leaving office, Phillips took up a role as a presenter on newly-launched 
television channel GB News. This career path of a short term in the EP being the extent of 
Phillips’ political experience means she can be classified as a One Off MEP. 
Magid Magid (Male, 30) was elected in 2019 for the Green Party in Yorkshire and the 
Humber. Magid is a Somali-British former refugee. Prior to his election to the EP, Magid 
served as a Councillor for Sheffield, as well as Lord Mayor of Sheffield, a ceremonial role 
selected by the council to represent the city in a number of ceremonial settings. Notably, in 
this role, Magid ceremonially banned American President Donald Trump from entering the 
city of Sheffield. After leaving the office of MEP, Magid founded the non-profit Union of 
Justice, an organisation dedicated to promoting racial and environmental justice based in 
Brussels, as well as authoring a book on these topics. As Magid possessed only political 
experience at the regional level prior to his election as MEP and did not go on to seek further 
elected office after leaving the EP, he falls under the category of One Off MEP.   
 
4.2.4 Former National Politician 
Former National Politicians are politicians with a career in domestic politics but choose to 
move to the EP to pursue a career there. As MEPs who were elected to the EP in 2019 for the 
first time could not have reasonably expected to create a career there, due to the imminent 
withdrawal of the UK from the EU, only MEPs elected for the first time prior to 2019 can be 
considered Former National Politicians, as the intent to create a career is a defining factor of 
the archetype. Therefore, only three MEPs elected in the 2019 EP election fit the archetype: 
Dianne Dodds (DUP), Chris Davies (LD), and Martina Anderson (SF). Two of these MEPs will 
be discussed later in this section as MEPs elected in Northern Ireland present enough 
unique trends for separate analysis.  




4.2.4.1 Case Study: Chris Davies (LD) 
Chris Davies (Male, 65) was first elected to office in the 1995 Westminster by-election to the 
electorate of Littleborough and Saddleworth for the Liberal Democrats. He had previously 
run unsuccessfully for election in the 1979, 1987, and 1992 general elections, and he failed 
to win re-election in the 1997 general election. He had also served as a councillor in 
Liverpool from 1980-84, and in Oldham from 1994-1998. Davies first won election to the EP 
in the 1999 EP election in the North West England constituency and would win re-election 
until 2014. In 2014, Davies won a parliamentarian of the year award for his role in creating 
Fish for the Future, an all party group promoting reform of the Common Fisheries Policy. 
Davies was re-elected to the EP in the 2019 EP election. In the period in which he was in 
between terms, he worked as a senior advisor in Brussels for FleishmanHillard, a global PR 
consultant firm. After leaving the EP in 2020, he took a position as senior advisor with Rud 
Pedersen Public Affairs, a Europe-focused public affairs firm. Davies’ career in domestic 
politics, and his subsequent career in the EP, means he falls under the category of a Former 
National Politician. 
 
4.2.5 Retiring Politicians 
Retiring Politicians are defined by van Geffen as politicians who are over 60 years old, have 
had a domestic career but use a term in the EP as a final office before retiring from politics 
entirely. Only one MEP from the 2019 cohort fit this criteria, as although two other MEPs 
elected in 2019 fully consider themselves to be retired, they also sought further office after 
leaving the EP, which disqualifies them from this category.  Brian Monteith (Brex.) was the 
only MEP elected in 2019 who falls under the category set out by van Geffen.  
4.2.5.1 Case Study: Brian Monteith (Brexit) 
Brian Monteith (Male, 61) was first elected to the Scottish Parliament in 1999 under the 
Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party for the Mid Scotland and Fife region. He won re-
election until he left the party in 2005 due to conspiring against the leader of the party, 
sitting as an independent and choosing not to run for re-election. Directly prior to his 
election, he worked as communications director of pro-Brexit lobby group Global Brexit, as 
well as editor and owner of ThinkScotland.org, a policy website. Monteith was elected to the 
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EP in 2019 in North East England for the Brexit Party. After leaving the EP, he returned to the 
roles he had occupied prior to election. As Monteith has had a notable domestic career in 
regional politics, serving a short time in the EP before retiring from electoral politics, he falls 
under the category of a Retiring Politician. 
  
4.2.6 Northern Irish MEPs 
This section will cover the three MEPs elected in the electorate of Northern Ireland. These 
MEPs warrant examination separate to those elected in the rest of the UK for a number of 
reasons. The divide between Irish republicanism, which aims for reunification with the 
Republic of Ireland, and unionism, which advocates for Northern Ireland to remain part of the 
UK. Due to this divide, elections in Northern Ireland are not typically contested by the parties 
which otherwise run candidates nationwide. Instead, elections are contested by parties 
specific to Northern Ireland, as well as ones which run candidates in elections in both 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In addition to this, EP elections in Northern 
Ireland are carried out using the Single Transferrable Vote system, which is the same system 
used for both European and general elections in the Republic of Ireland. All of these factors 
mean the constituency of Northern Ireland is unique compared to others in the UK.  
The career paths of MEPs elected in Northern Ireland followed trajectories which differed 
greatly from their counterparts in the rest of the UK. All three of these MEPs were female 
and had served as MLAs before their election to the EP. Additionally, Naomi Long (All.) had 
served as a MP, Councillor and Lord Mayor of Belfast in her political career. Two of the three, 
Martina Anderson (SF) and Diane Dodds (DUP) were incumbents, having sat since 2012 and 
2009 respectively. However, while only Anderson actively ran for office post-election in the 
2019 general election, all three of these MEPs were appointed as MLAs after they left office, 
in order to replace absences made in Stormont by resigning MLAs, in a process unique to 
Stormont known as co-option (Devenport, 2015). Through this process, Northern Irish parties 
may appoint MLAs to fill vacancies left by resigning MLAs of their party, to avoid the cost of 
holding by-elections and potentially unbalancing the party political balance within the six-
member constituencies of the Northern Ireland Assembly. This trajectory of going from 
regional, to European, to regional politics is completely different to any other career path in 
the 2019 MEP cohort. The unique nature of this is amplified by the fact that these MEPs did 
not win re-election to these seats.  
 
Page 43 of 65 
 
4.2.6.1 Case Studies: Diane Dodds (DUP), Naomi Long (All.) 
Diane Dodds (Female, 61) was first elected in the 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly elections 
in the electorate of West Belfast for the DUP. She was also elected to the Belfast City 
Council in 2005. After losing her seat in Stormont in the 2007 election, she was elected as 
MEP for the DUP in Northern Ireland in the 2009 EP election. Prior to serving in politics, 
Dodds was a constituency worker for the DUP offices. After she left the EP in 2020, she was 
co-opted to fill a seat in the Stormont constituency of Upper Bann, which was left vacant 
when DUP MLA Carla Lockheart was elected to the House of Commons in the 2019 GE. 
From January 2020 to June 2021, Dodds served as the Minister for the Economy in the 
Northern Ireland Executive. While Dodds’ transition from domestic to European politics 
would otherwise qualify her as a Former National Politician due to her commitment to 
creating a new career in the EP, her return to domestic politics after leaving the EP indicate 
that her career path falls outside the definitions of any of the archetypes set out by Scarrow 
and van Geffen. 
Naomi Long (Female, 47) was first elected to office in 2001, to the Belfast City Council. In 
2003, she was elected to the Northern Ireland Assembly in the constituency of Belfast East, 
where she served as MLA until 2010, when she stood down as she had been elected MP for 
Belfast East in the 2010 general election. Prior to her entry into politics, she worked as an 
environmental engineer. She had also served a term as Lord Mayor of Belfast from 2009-
2010. Long lost her Westminster seat in the 2015 general election. Following this, she 
returned to Stormont in the 2016 election, winning election in the Belfast East constituency. 
In 2016 she was also made Leader of the Alliance Party. In 2019, she was elected MEP for 
Northern Ireland in the 2019 EP election, after which she resigned her office as MLA. After 
leaving the EP in 2020, she was co-opted to the office of MLA in the Belfast East 
constituency, filling a vacancy left by the resignation of Alliance MLA Máire Hendron, who 
had been co-opted the year prior to fill Long’s vacant seat. She was appointed Minister of 
Justice in the Northern Ireland Executive that year. Due to Long’s long and varied career in 
politics prior to entering the EP, it would be possible to classify her as a Former National 
Politician, if she had not been elected in 2019, as there could be no expectation of building a 
career in the EP due to Brexit being imminent. Similarly, she cannot be classified as a 
Retiring Politician, as she re-entered office after leaving the EP. Therefore, Long’s career as a 
politician falls outside any of the categories set out by Scarrow and van Geffen. 
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4.2.7 Others 
This section will cover members of the 2019 MEP cohort whose political careers fall outside 
the archetypes as defined by Scarrow and van Geffen, excluding the Northern Irish MEPs 
discussed above. Although this is a grouping defined by its heterogeneity, in the five MEPs 
who fall under this category, one sub grouping can be defined: MEPs who could be 
considered Retiring Politicians if they were old enough. This consists of three MEPs: Martin 
Horwood (LD), Aileen McLeod (SNP), and Christian Allard (SNP). These MEPs had previously 
sat in the House of Commons or the Scottish Parliament and had entered the EP for the first 
time in 2019. Additionally, Allard ran for the Scottish Parliament in the 2021 election. 
However, none of these MEPs fit neatly into an archetype. None of them are over 60, 
meaning they don’t qualify as a Retiring Politician. As they entered the EP in 2019, with no 
viable prospects of building a career there, they don’t qualify as European Careerists or 
Former National Politicians. Due to their past political experience, they don’t qualify as One-
Off MEPs. As such, not fitting into any other category, they can be classed as Others. 
Two other MEPs elected in 2019 do not fit into established categories. The first of these is 
Nosheena Mobarik (Cons.), who prior to serving as an MEP was nominated as a Life Peer in 
the House of Lords. Mobarik, who unsuccessfully stood for election to the EP in 2014, was 
subsequently nominated as a life peer. However, in 2017, she was appointed to the EP to fill 
the seat of resigning MEP Ian Duncan. For the duration of her term of office as MEP, she 
took a leave of absence from the House of Lords due to EU laws prohibiting dual mandates. 
After leaving the EP, she returned to the House of Lords. As the House of Lords is not a 
directly elected political office, but still a domestic political office of note, it does not fit into 
any of the established archetypes which focus on electoral politics. As such, Mobarik’s 
experience as a Lord means that she can be classified as Other. The second MEP who falls 
outside of established categories is Ann Widdecombe (Brex.) who, prior to her election to 
the EP in 2019, had served as a Conservative MP for the electorate of Maidstone and the 
Weald from 1987 to 2010, after which retiring from electoral politics. However, she came out 
of retirement to contest the 2019 EP election for the Brexit Party, also contesting the seat of 
Plymouth Sutton and Devonport in the 2019 general election. This unique career path of a 
politician with a notable political career coming out of retirement to contest an EP election, 
followed by a run for domestic office, does not align with any of the archetypes of MEP 
careers as set out by Scarrow and van Geffen, and as such is placed in the Other category. 
  
Page 45 of 65 
 
4.2.7.1 Case Studies: Ann Widdecombe (Brex.) and Christian Allard (SNP) 
Ann Widdecombe (Female, 72) first entered political office in 1976, when she was elected a 
District Councillor for Runnymede Council. After failed bids for election in the 1979 and 1983 
general elections, Widdecombe was elected in 1987 for the Conservative Party in the 
constituency of Maidstone. Widdecombe would hold this electorate until 2010, where she 
stood down, retiring from politics. During her time in office, she served as Minister of State 
for Employment and Minister of State for Prisons from 1995 to 1997, and then Shadow 
Health Secretary and Shadow Home Secretary in opposition from 1999 to 2001, after which 
she retired from front bench positions. Prior to her entering office, she was an administrator 
at London University. After she left office, she worked as a columnist for the Daily Express 
and took various political commentary positions in the media. In 2019, she came out of 
political retirement to run for the Brexit Party in the 2019 EP election, where she was elected 
to the constituency of South West England. She also unsuccessfully contested the seat of 
Plymouth Sutton and Devonport for the Brexit Party in the 2019 general election. After 
leaving the EP, she continued to work as a political commentator. Widdecombe’s long 
domestic career followed by nine years of political retirement, and subsequent return to 
electoral politics to contest the 2019 EP and general elections, does not fit into any 
archetype of MEP careers, falling into the Other category 
Christian Allard (Male, 51) first came to political office in 2013, when he was appointed to fill 
the vacant additional member seat created when MSP Mark McDonald resigned to contest 
the 2013 Aberdeen Donside by-election. He was appointed despite not having ran in the 
2011 Holyrood election due to a quirk of the Additional Member System used to elect the 
Scottish Parliament; as the SNP had won every constituency in the North East of Scotland 
region with McDonald as their only regional list MSP, they had no other list candidates to 
nominate and as such were able to appoint Allard.  Prior to his appointment, Allard had 
worked as a constituency officer for SNP MSP Dennis Robertson. Allard ran for re-election in 
the 2016 Holyrood election on the regional list, but did not return to Holyrood. In 2017, Allard 
was elected to the Aberdeen City Council, and in 2019, he was elected to the EP in the 2019 
elections for the SNP in the constituency of Scotland. After leaving office, Allard ran in the 
2021 Holyrood election, again on the North East of Scotland regional list, but did not win re-
election. Allard does not fit the One Off category due to his political experience before and 
after leaving the EP, and he does not fit as a Former National Politician due to his election in 
2019, where he could not expect to build a career in the EP. Therefore, he falls under the 
Other category.    
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5. Discussion 
5.1 Hypotheses Revisited 
5.1.1 Hypothesis 1: Incumbency and Post-EP Elections 
The first of the hypotheses which this thesis aimed to test was that MEPs elected for their 
first term in 2019 would be less likely to go on to seek domestic office than incumbent 
MEPs. This research found that, of all the 24 MEPs elected in the 2019 EP election who had 
sat as an MEP prior to 2019, only 4 ran for office after being elected. In comparison, of the 
49 MEPs who were elected for the first time in 2019, 12 ran for election after being elected 
as MEP, equal to roughly 25% compared to the 12.5% of the incumbents. This hypothesis 
was based on the assumption that politicians with more political experience, which they had 
gained through sitting multiple terms in office as MEPs, would be considered more valuable 
than politicians for whom their election in 2019 was their first elected office. However, this 
hypothesis was proven false, in that more MEPs who had never been elected to a regional or 
national political office ran for office after being elected.  
One possible explanation for this trend would be to look at the elections contested by these 
MEPs. The majority of the offices contested by the 2019 MEP cohort were seats in the 2019 
general election, in which seats are elected using FPTP, a system which heavily favours two 
major parties at the expense of other parties. Of these MEPs who contested seats in the 
2019 general election, 5 were Brexit Party members, 4 were Green Party MEPs, one was a 
SNP MEP, and one was a Sinn Féin MEP. As the Brexit and Green parties are minor parties 
who are unlikely to win election in the FPTP system, there is a strong likelihood that these 
candidates did not realistically expect to win the seats they contested, instead running for 
other reasons, such as to boost visibility for their party or to provide an option for a protest 
vote. While the other two parties sending MEPs to contest seats in the 2019 general election, 
the SNP and Sinn Féin, are third parties, they are also regionalist parties who only run 
candidates in Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively, where they have strong support 
bases. As such, their runs for office can be seen as having a serious possibility of winning 
election. Further evidence of this theory is that of all the MEPs who ran for office after being 
elected in the 2019 EP election, the only MEP to be successfully elected was Alan Smyth 
(SNP) who ran in the 2019 general election. 
The fact that so few incumbent MEPs chose to run for election in domestic politics brings 
into question the value of experience at the EP level. If the political experience that these 
politicians had accumulated while serving in the EP was considered to be an attractive asset 
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for domestic politics, it would stand to reason that more of these MEPs would have run for 
domestic office following their departure from the EP. One possible explanation is that these 
MEPs had no interest in domestic politics. This could be due to a particular affinity for the 
EU as an institution, or a dislike for the institutions of national and regional politics, but it 
would explain why so few of these MEPs with experience in the EP chose to pursue careers 
domestically. Similarly, a simple desire to retire from electoral politics could motivate 
incumbent MEPs, many of whom had served upwards of ten years in office prior to 2019, to 
choose to not seek further elected office.  
A third possible explanation for this trend is that the political experience that came from 
being an MEP was considered a negative, rather than a positive. As public opinion on the EU 
was divided, with the majority of Wales and England outside of London voting to leave the 
EU in the 2016 Brexit referendum, a long experience serving in the EP might have been seen 
as a detrimental association with an unpopular institution. This would correlate to the victory 
of Alan Smyth, who won a seat in Scotland, a pro EU region, with the SNP, a pro EU party.   
The number of MEPs elected for their first term in 2019 who went on to run for election 
being relatively low, at 12 out of 49, could also be explained as being a product of a negative 
affiliation with an unattractive European institution. However, while this may ring true for pro-
EU parties running in predominately anti-EU regions, such as the Green Party and Liberal 
Democrats in England, if this assumption were to be true it would follow that parties whose 
stance of the EU matches that of their primary electorate would field more ex-MEPs as 
candidates, e.g., the Brexit Party and England, or the SNP and Scotland. Looking at the data, 
the Brexit Party and the SNP both fielded a number of ex-MEP candidates, with 6 Brexit Party 
MEPs and 2 SNP MEPs running for office after leaving the EP. One notable irregularity with 
this data, however, is that 3 of these Brexit Party MEPs contested seats in the London 
Assembly, one of the most anti-Brexit regions of England. However, this overall correlation 
between pro- and anti-Brexit parties running ex-MEPs in pro- and anti-Brexit regions of the 
UK is not particularly strong, with 10 ex-MEPs running in regions with matching Brexit 
sentiment, and 8 ex-MEPs running in regions with opposed Brexit sentiment (counting the 
two Brexit Party MEPs who ran for two separate offices as separate attempts). If there was 
a stronger correlation between party Brexit stance and the Brexit stance of the regions they 
ran in, this would indicate that experience in the EP had a strong influence on choosing 
candidates for domestic office. However, the weak correlation indicates that other factors 
would have influenced this decision to an equal or greater extent. Without being able to 
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interview a statistically significant sample of the 2019 MEP cohort, it is unlikely that the true 
motivators behind the post-EP careers of these MEPs will be uncovered.  
 
 5.1.2 Hypothesis 2: Brexit Party MEPs and Future Political Office 
The second hypothesis which this thesis aimed to test was that Brexit Party MEPs elected in 
2019 would be less likely to go on to seek domestic political careers than MEPs from other 
parties. The research conducted found this hypothesis to be proven partially true, as while 
more Brexit Party MEPs went on to run for office than of any other party numerically, as a 
percentage of total MEPs elected both the Green Party and the SNP had more MEPs who 
went on to seek office. 6 Brexit Party MEPs went on to run for office after being elected to 
the EP, with 4 of these MEPs running in two separate elections. This comes to 21% of their 
29 MEPs. In comparison, the SNP had two ex-MEPs run for office after leaving the EP, or 
66% of their 3 MEPs, and the Green Party had 4 ex-MEPs run, or 57% of their 7 MEPs. 
Additionally, Sinn Féin’s single MEP ran for office, meaning their party had 100% of their 
MEPs run for office. Therefore, while the hypothesis can be considered to be partially true, 
the relationship between political party and seeking office post-EP is worthy of examination 
regardless.  
An important factor to consider for this trend of the number of Brexit Party MEPs seeking 
office after election is the timing of these elections. The 2019 general election occurred 
midway through the term of the 2019 MEP cohort, being called by newly appointed 
Conservative PM Boris Johnson to strengthen his then-weak mandate for renewed 
withdrawal negotiations with the EU. Crucially, Nigel Farage, leader of the Brexit Party, made 
the decision to not run candidates in Conservative-held seats, focusing on challenging seats 
held by anti-Brexit candidates in order to ensure the election of a pro-Brexit majority (BBC, 
2019a). This resulted in four Brexit Party MEPs leaving the party to sit with the 
Conservatives, as well as a reduction in the number of general election candidates being 
fielded from 593 to 276. Among those whose candidacy was cancelled were Brexit Party 
MEPs Matthew Patten, Alexandra Phillips, and Michael Heaver. MEP Rupert Lowe was also 
listed as a prospective parliamentary candidate but withdrew his nomination prior to the 
deadline for fear of splitting the pro-Brexit vote. These four Brexit Party MEPs whose 
candidacies were quashed wouldn’t have pushed the Brexit Party’s percentage of ex-MEPs 
seeking domestic office higher than the Green Party or the SNP, but would have further 
increased the number of total MEPs to over double that of the second highest party.  
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Another factor of this timing is that the nature of the elections contested, and their purpose 
for the Brexit Party. In the 2019 general election, the Brexit Party stood candidates with the 
goal of securing a pro-Brexit majority in Westminster in order to ensure that the UK withdrew 
from the EU. Following the UK’s withdrawal, the Brexit Party rebranded itself to Reform UK, 
announcing a new set of policies focused on domestic issues. The first elections contested 
under the Reform UK banner were the 2021 regional elections to the Senedd and the London 
Assembly, in both of which Reform UK failed to elect any candidates.  
Another interesting trend is that of all the parties, Brexit Party MEPs contested more 
elections than any other party, with ex-MEPs running in the 2019 general election, and the 
2021 Senedd and London Assembly elections. In addition, 4 Brexit Party MEPs were the only 
MEPs who contested multiple elections out of the entire 2019 cohort, with two MEPs 
contesting both the 2019 general election and the 2021 London Assembly election, and two 
contesting the general election and the 2021 Senedd election. These 4 MEPs were the only 
Brexit Party MEPs to contest elections outside of the general election, which, when taken in 
the context of Reform UK’s origin as the Brexit Party, can be seen to indicate that these 
MEPs were the only politicians who were committed to the party as more than a vehicle to 
ensure Brexit got done. As such, the post-EP ambitions, or lack thereof, of the Brexit Party 
MEPs indicate that while stopping Brexit was a high priority, the party itself was only seen as 
a platform to develop a full political career by a small handful of its MEPs. In contrast, the 
Brexit MEPs who either stood for office in the 2019 general election, or were prepared to, 
can be seen as potentially not a commitment to the party itself as a long term political entity. 
Instead, their candidacy was a means to ensure the withdrawal of the UK from the EU 
actually went through, as the Brexit Party’s tactic of only contesting Labour-held seats to 
split the vote and ensure a pro-Brexit majority likely had very little risk of Brexit Party 
candidates winning seats, meaning there was little long term commitment required from the 
candidates themselves. 
 
5.2 Trends in Political Experience Prior to Election 
One trend which can be observed in the career paths of the 2019 MEP cohort is the overall 
lack of political experience prior to their election. MEPs who had experience with elected 
political office at the regional or national level were in a clear minority, with only 9 of the 
cohort having held such an office prior to becoming an MEP. Instead, the cohort was 
dominated by MEPs who had either failed election attempts or no political experience, who 
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comprised 38 of the 73 MEPs, or just over half. When combined with the 21 MEPs for whom 
the highest office held was at the local level, it becomes apparent that the cohort consisted 
primarily of politicians with no experience in regional or national electoral politics. However, 
a noteworthy figure is that of all the political parties who won seats in the election, the Brexit 
Party had the largest number of MEPs with no prior elected experience, with only 5 of their 
29 MEPs having ever held office. In comparison, the party which won the second-most seats 
in the 2019 election, the Liberal Democrats, had only 4 of their 16 MEPs with no elected 
experience. Notably, 8 of their MEPs had held office in local politics prior to their election to 
the EP. The Labour Party also had an even split of 5 prior office holders and 5 newcomers. 
However, the Green Party MEPs were dominated by politicians with experience at the local 
level, with 6 of their 7 MEPs having experience as councillors prior to election. Another 
noteworthy trend is that the MEPs elected by both the Conservative and Labour parties were 
almost entirely incumbents, with all 4 Conservative MEPs and 9 out of 10 Labour MEPs 
having been elected to the EP prior to the 2019 election.  
One factor in explaining the rates of political experience in MEPs per party is the overall 
position of these parties within the national election system. The Brexit Party, being newly 
founded to contest the 2019 EP election, held very few offices as a party, with the few they 
held prior to the 2019 EP being politicians who had defected from other parties. As such, 
their access to politicians with experience to stand in the 2019 EP election would have been 
limited, forcing them to rely primarily on candidates with no political experience. On the other 
hand, the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party are parties with established presences in 
the UK’s electoral system as third parties, with elected representatives in national, regional, 
and local government. Due to the FPTP voting system used to elect MPs to the House of 
Commons, these third parties are underrepresented at the national level, but have a number 
of councillors elected in local politics (Pickling and Cracknell, 2021). As such, it stands to 
reason that, due to these parties electing primarily MEPs with council backgrounds in the 
2019 EP election, these parties are using their established base of council politicians as a 
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5.3 The Careers of the Northern Irish MEPs 
As discussed in section 5.1, the majority of the 2019 MEP cohort did not seek further 
election, with only 16 of the 73 MEPs running for office in domestic politics after being 
elected to the EP, and only 1 successfully being elected. As a substantial amount of analysis 
has been done on this topic in section 5.1, this section will instead focus on other trends.  
One of these trends is that while only 1 member of the 2019 MEP cohort was elected, the 
three MEPs representing Northern Ireland were all appointed to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly through the process of secondment to fill vacancies. These three vacancies were 
created by three existing MLAs leaving the Assembly, however, each of these MLAs stood 
down for different reasons: one was elected to the House of Commons in the 2019 general 
election, one retired after a 15-year career as MLA, and one stood down after being 
seconded to fill the vacancy left by the election of the MEP she would be replaced by. The 
process of secondment is specific to the Northern Ireland Assembly due to the STV voting 
system used, however, the use of secondment to ensure the return of the three Northern 
Irish MEPs across three different parties is a unique situation worth examining. While the 
Northern Ireland Assembly is unique amongst the political offices of the UK because of its 
use of STV, it is also the only legislative body in the UK to operate on the principle of power 
sharing. As per the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, the executive of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly is required to include at least one Unionist and at least one Nationalist party, with 
one of each taking the office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister. If these conditions 
are unable to be fulfilled, then the Assembly cannot sit, and no legislation can be passed. 
This has led to many situations where disagreements between unionist and nationalist 
parties can turn into deadlocks in which the Executive is unable to function for long periods 
of time. Most notably, a dispute over a failed green energy scheme in 2017 led to the 
Executive collapsing and remaining suspended until January 2020 (McDonald and O'Carrol, 
2020). This new executive coalition included the DUP, Sinn Fein, and the Alliance Party, as 
well as the UUP and the Social Democratic and Labour Party, with ex-MEPs Diane Dodds 
(DUP) and Naomi Long (Alliance) taking roles as ministers in the Executive.  
These former MEP’s secondment to the Northern Ireland Assembly could be explained as a 
desire by these parties to return these experienced politicians to regional politics in a time 
where the balance of power was fragile in the Assembly. All three of these MEPs had served 
as MLAs prior to being elected to the EP. Two of them, Dodds (DUP) and Anderson (SF) had 
served in the EP for over two terms, while Long (Alliance) was elected to the EP for the first 
time in 2019. Dodds was seconded to a vacancy created when DUP MLA Carla Lockhart was 
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elected to the House of Commons in the 2019 general election, and Anderson was seconded 
to replace retiring Sinn Fein MLA Raymond McCartney, who retired in January 2020 after 
sitting as MLA for 15 years. While Dodds’ secondment could be due to the convenient timing 
of the 2019 general election, it’s possible that, given the timing of his retirement, McCartney 
was requested by the party to retire to allow Anderson to sit as MLA. On the other hand 
Long’s return to the Assembly was explicitly planned beforehand as the MLA seconded to 
her seat, Máire Hendron, announced her intention to stand down immediately upon the UK 
leaving the EU, with Long stating she would return to the Assembly (BBC, 2019b). 
Regardless, the return of these MEPs to the Northern Ireland Assembly could be due to the 
freshly negotiated power sharing agreement, with a desire to have experienced politicians to 
increase the political skill of the respective parties’ Assembly delegation. This could be 
further linked to the ongoing negotiations regarding the future of Northern Ireland and the 
EU, with negotiations surrounding the Irish border being of particular importance to the 
parties in Stormont. The experience of these former MEPs, particularly those with multiple 
terms served in the EP, may have been seen as valuable assets for the future negotiation of 
the border issue. Furthermore, as the next Assembly election is not due to be held until 2022, 
the use of secondment to appoint these politicians to the Assembly would ensure they were 
able to return in such a timeframe that their EU expertise could be utilised as soon as 
possible. 
 
5.4 Second Order Election Model and the 2019 EP Election in the UK 
The Second Order Election Model is a framework for examining trends within EP elections 
created by Reif and Schmitt (1980), which argues that, as voters believe there is less at stake 
in these elections, their voting patterns are motivated less so with the immediate result of 
their vote on the EP, and more by punishing or rewarding the parties governing at a national 
level. This contrasts with a first order election, which is typically electing to a national 
parliament, where voters will vote motivated by policy concerns. This section will examine to 
what extent the 2019 EP election in the UK can be considered first or second order elections, 
and what effect that may have had on the political careers of the 2019 MEP cohorts.  
Reif and Schmitt use three voter behaviours to classify the EP elections as second order 
when compared to first order national elections. These are 1) that turnout is lower 2) that 
parties in government at the national level will suffer losses and 3) that larger parties will do 
worse, while smaller parties will do better. Voters may be motivated to vote in different 
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patterns between national and European elections based on different policy priorities at 
different levels, but they believe the most powerful motivator for voters to switch their voting 
patterns is to express dissatisfaction with national governments.  
Using Reif and Schmitt’s metrics to compare national and European elections in the UK, the 
first metric of turnout shows the 2017 general election as having a turnout of 69%, while the 
2019 EP election had a turnout of 37%, a marked decrease. The second metric of governing 
party losses is evidenced by the fact that the Conservative Party, which were the governing 
party at the time of the 2019 EP elections, came fifth place overall with 9% of the vote, their 
worst nationwide election result ever. The third metric of smaller parties gaining while larger 
parties losing also holds true, as the two parties who did the best in the 2019 EP election 
were the Brexit Party and the Liberal Democrats, parties with no and minimal representation 
respectively in Westminster. Therefore, the 2019 EP election in the UK can be considered to 
be a second order one.  
However, in a 2019 paper, Galpin and Trenz argue that the 2019 EP elections should be 
considered not as second order national elections, but as “first order polity” elections. They 
argue that the primary motivation for voters in the 2019 EP election is not merely punishing 
the incumbent government of member-states, instead, voters are motivated to vote in the EP 
elections by constitutional issues of the EU itself. They point to the decline of the traditional 
centre-left and centre-right EP political groupings, and the increase of votes for groupings 
with alternative politics such as liberals, green politics, and far-right nationalism as evidence 
of this, noting that while specific EU policies were not the focus of election campaigns, 
debates over the core values of the EU, such as human rights, gender and LGBTQ+ equality, 
freedom of speech, and social liberalism dominated the election campaigns leading up to 
the election. They argue that the election is used as an opportunity to cast judgement not 
against national governments but the elites of the EU and the balance of national and 
supranational sovereignty from both the left and right wings of politics, with the progressive 
empowerment of the EP as an institution providing a more than symbolic venue to affect 
change.  
However, to what extent can this be applied specifically to the 2019 EP election within the 
UK? Galpin and Trenz do bring up the election in the UK specifically as an example of an 
election dominated by the core values of the EU, noting that both the governing Conservative 
Party and main opposition Labour Party lost votes over their Brexit stances compared to the 
pro-EU Liberal Democrats and anti-EU Brexit Party. However, while the elections in the EU27 
can be argued to be first order polity elections for the reasons above, a key factor that Galpin 
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and Trenz neglect the impact of is the explicitly domestic nature of the 2019 EP elections in 
the UK, due to the ongoing active Brexit negotiation. While the focus of the election was on 
EU-focused issues, the process of the UK negotiating the withdrawal from the EU, which was 
ongoing at the time of the election, shift the focus of these arguments away from the EU 
elites as Galpin and Trenz argue, towards the domestic politicians, and specifically the 
governing Conservative Party, who suffered the biggest loss in the EP election compared to 
their result at the prior general election. In particular, the Brexit Party and the Liberal 
Democrats, who campaigned specifically in response to the progress of the Brexit 
negotiations being carried out by the UK Government, were parties who saw significant 
success in the 2019 EP elections. Additionally, this was the first national election contested 
by both the Brexit Party and Change UK, two parties established explicitly in response to the 
UK Government’s Brexit negotiation process (Vasilopoulou, 2020). As such, while Galpin and 
Trenz’s categorisation of the 2019 EP election as a first order polity election may hold true 
for the election when considered as an EU-wide election, the nature of the election 
specifically in the UK in the context of the ongoing Brexit negotiations mean that the election 
in the UK can be considered a second order national election. 
Under the premise that the 2019 EP election in the UK can be considered a second order 
national election, what can be said about its impact on the career paths of the MEPs 
elected? The clearest way in which this impact is felt is in the election results, specifically 
the drop in seats from the Conservative and Labour parties, who lost 15 and 10 seats 
respectively compared to their 2014 election result, and the increase in seats from the 
Liberal Democrats and the Green Party, who increased their number of seats from 1 and 3 in 
2014 to 16 and 7 respectively. This is in addition to the disappearance of UKIP, who dropped 
from winning 24 seats in the 2014 EP election to zero in 2019, and the rise of the Brexit 
Party, which, in it’s electoral debut, won 29 seats. As a result of voters voting in response to 
their dissatisfaction with the Conservative Government’s Brexit negotiations, these three 
parties rose to account for 52 of the UK’s 73 MEPs, all but 6 of whom were first time MEPs 
(including two former UKIP MEPs who changed allegiances, and two Liberal Democrat MEPs 
who were elected prior but lost their seats in 2014). In contrast, the Conservative and Labour 
parties, who were the governing and opposition parties respectively, were reduced to 14 
MEPs between them, all but one of whom were incumbents. As such, the main impact of the 
second order national nature of the 2019 EP election can be seen as the influx of first time 
MEPs from parties critical of the national Government and Opposition, at the cost of 
incumbent experienced MEPs affiliated with these parties.  
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6. Conclusion 
With analysis of trends in the findings of this thesis completed, this concluding section will 
discuss the implications of the 2019 EP election in a broader context and consider avenues 
for future research on the subject, as well as the limitations of the research with the benefit 
of hindsight.  
6.1. Implications 
While this research has focused on the 2019 EP election, the career trajectories of its MEPs, 
and the implications of their return, or lack thereof, to the domestic sphere, the implications 
of their absence on the EP as an institution is also a topic worthy of examination. With the 
removal of the 73 British MEPs, 27 of these seats were redistributed among the EU27, while 
the remaining 46 were held unfilled to be assigned in event of future expansion of the EU. 
This had a small impact on the balance of the political groupings of the EP, as the 
redistribution of the seats of the 2019 MEP cohort among the EU27 caused net gains for 
some groupings, and net losses for others. However, the full effects of this withdrawal fall 
outside the scope of this thesis, as in order to paint a full picture of the impact of this seat 
redistribution, examining the UK’s MEP delegation elected in the 2014 EP election would be 
required. This is because in order to fully grasp the impact of the redistribution, it must be 
examined in context of the trends of the UK’s recent history of EP elections, as the results of 
the 2019 EP election were an outlier in terms of political party strength. As such, they do not 
present a full picture of the shift in party power in the EP.  
Similarly, the withdrawal of 73 MEPs may have had an effect on the political strength of the 
EP as an institution within the broader context of the EU as a complex political entity. 24 of 
the MEPs in the 2019 cohort had been elected to the EP prior to 2019, with some of them 
having sat as MEP for upwards of 15 years, and as such their withdrawal represents a loss in 
institutional knowledge which may affect the EP’s ability to pass legislation effectively. 
Again, examining this falls outside the scope of this thesis, as to effectively compare the 
political experience of the 2019 MEP cohort to the MEPs who failed to win re-election an 
examination of the MEPs elected in 2014 would be warranted.  
6.2 Limitations 
One of the major limitations discovered during the process of writing this thesis is the lack 
of existing studies with which the data complied on the 2019 MEP cohort could be 
compared. Most existing studies found did not cover a single term cohort of MEPs from a 
single country. While a handful of studies existed which covered MEPs elected from the UK, 
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they all covered multiple terms compiled into the same data set. This meant that it was 
impossible to compare the 2019 MEP cohort to other previous cohorts to examine trends 
over time, as instead the data would only allow comparison to an amalgamation of multiple 
cohorts.  
The timing of which the research for this thesis was conducted also presented two 
limitations. Firstly, while numerous opportunities have occurred for the 2019 MEP cohort to 
advance their political careers, it is impossible to perform a long term analysis on the career 
trajectories of the cohort. Secondly, it is impossible to compare the trajectories of the cohort 
to the MEPs elected in the EU27 in 2019, as the MEPs from the UK were the only ones who 
had their terms cut short due to Brexit. In the future, research comparing the career 
trajectories of the entire cohort of MEPs elected EU-wide, or in a selection of member states, 
in 2019 may prove valuable to determine the overall impact of Brexit on the UK MEPs’ career 
trajectories compared to a regular MEP career. 
While the use of Scarrow and van Geffen’s categorisation of MEP career archetypes was an 
appropriate framework for categorising the careers of the 2019 MEP cohort, it presented 
some challenges. The largest of these was that the original study was ambiguous as to how 
it classified as MEPs who ran for office unsuccessfully. The decision was made to expand 
the definition of the Domestic Careerist archetype to include failed runs for office to provide 
a more thorough examination of the MEPs’ career trajectories, as only one MEP was 
successfully elected. Additionally, as mentioned above, Scarrow’s original 1997 paper did 
not separate out the cohorts by year, which made a direct comparison to the 2019 cohort 
even harder. Furthermore, Scarrow’s study covered the MEPs elected from 1979 to 1994, 
since which the EP has evolved in terms of strength, as well as the UK switching from FPTP 
to proportional representation to elect its MEPs, meaning that while the data would still be 
useful, it would come with several caveats that would preclude an exact comparison to the 
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6.3 Thesis Conclusion 
This thesis aimed to identify trends in the political experience of the MEPs elected by the UK 
in the 2019 European Parliament election, focusing on their political careers prior to entering 
the EP, and to what extent they pursued a political career after leaving the EP. The 2019 MEP 
cohort was chosen due to the unique situation of their mid-term withdrawal from the EP due 
to Brexit, as it offered an opportunity to examine the role of the European Parliament in the 
careers of politicians in multi-level political systems. 
The research found that the majority of MEPs elected in 2019 had no experience in national 
or regional politics prior to entering the EP, and ran for very few electoral office during or 
after their term in the EP. The MEPs who did were mostly affiliated with the Brexit Party, and 
contested seats mainly in the 2019 general election. MEPs elected for the first time in 2019 
were twice as likely to contest elections than MEPs elected in prior years. Of all the MEPs 
who contested elections after being elected to the EP, only one of them won election, 
although three Northern Irish MEPs were seconded to the Northern Ireland Assembly, and 
two MEPs were appointed Lords Temporal. 
This research, as part of the broader field of research on political careers within the EU, and 
on the EP as an elected body, indicates that the MEPs elected in 2019 by the UK had a low 
level of political experience owing to shifting vote shares in response to the Government and 
opposition’s handling of Brexit negotiations. Future research in this field may be needed, 
however, to examine the long term political careers of these MEPs, and how their 
experiences compare to their former colleagues elected in the same election by other 
member states of the EU.  
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Appendix 1: Sources for Data Gathered on MEP Careers 
The following consists of the sources used to compile the data set used in this thesis. MEPs 
are listed by order of last name alphabetically, with their party affiliation at time of election 
listed. Multiple sources were used where needed, but single sources, such as LinkedIn 
accounts and official party profiles, were prioritised where possible.  
Ainslie, Scott (Green): http://bright-green.org/2019/05/27/who-are-the-greens-new-meps-2-
scott-ainslie/  
Allard, Christian (SNP): https://www.linkedin.com/in/christian-allard-91931332/  
Anderson, Martina (SF): https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-51341485  




Bennion, Phil (LD): https://liberal-international.org/people/phil-bennion/ 
https://www.linkedin.com/in/phil-bennion-2a15ab4/  
Brophy, Jane (LD): https://www.libdems.org.uk/jane-brophy          
https://www.linkedin.com/in/jane-brophy-b1791124/  
Bull, David (Brexit): https://mailchi.mp/reformparty.uk/introducing-dr-david-bull-new-deputy-
leader https://www.linkedin.com/in/drdavidbull/  
Bullock, Jonathan (Brexit): 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190609163419/http://www.jonathanbullockmep.uk/about-
jonathan/  
Bunting, Judith (LD): https://judithbunting.com  
Cato, Molly Scott (Green): https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/author/molly-scott-cato/ 
https://www.linkedin.com/in/molly-scott-cato-51046748/  
Chowns, Ellie (Green): 
https://councillors.herefordshire.gov.uk/mgUserInfo.aspx?UID=50001686  
Corbett, Richard (Labour): https://www.linkedin.com/in/richard-corbett-1715541b/ 
https://www.richardcorbett.org.uk/  
Dance, Seb (Labour): https://www.linkedin.com/in/seb-dance-3b23444/  
Daubney, Martin (Brexit): https://twitter.com/MartinDaubney/status/1424767660009697286 
https://www.linkedin.com/in/martin-daubney-6045923b/  
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Dhamija, Dinesh (LD): https://www.linkedin.com/in/dinesh-dhamija/  
Dodds, Diane (DUP): https://www.linkedin.com/in/diane-dodds-mep-2bb15757/ 
https://www.itv.com/news/utv/2019-12-23/dup-s-diane-dodds-to-become-upper-bann-mla  
Dowding, Gina (Green): https://northlancs.greenparty.org.uk/people/gina-dowding.html  
England Kerr, Andrew (Brexit): https://twitter.com/englandkerrmep  
Evans, Jill (PC): https://www.greens-efa.eu/en/person/evans-jill  
Farage, Nigel (Brexit): https://news.sky.com/story/nigel-farage-steps-down-as-reform-uk-
leader-after-saying-he-has-achieved-his-lifes-work-12238504  
Forman, Lance (Brexit): https://www.linkedin.com/in/lance-forman-a9b3bb10/  
Fox, Claire (Brexit): http://clairefox.org.uk/  
Gibson, Barbara (LD): https://twitter.com/Barb_G  
Gill, Nathan (Brexit): https://www.linkedin.com/in/nathan-gill-449899b/ 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-politics-47183976  
Gill, Neena (Labour): https://www.linkedin.com/in/neena-gill-cbe-79151740/ 
Glancy, James (Brexit): https://www.jamesglancy.com/biography 
Griffin, Theresa (Labour): https://www.linkedin.com/in/theresa-griffin/  
Habib, Benyamin (Brexit): https://www.linkedin.com/in/ben-habib-b38a2844/  
Hannan, Daniel (Conservative): https://www.linkedin.com/in/daniel-hannan-60b0b821/  
Harris, Lucy (Brexit): https://www.linkedin.com/in/lucy-h-189b2454/  
Heaver, Michael (Brexit): https://twitter.com/michael_heaver?lang=en 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/197601/MICHAEL_HEAVER/home  
Hook, Antony (LD): https://www.antonyhook.org/news-centre/  
Horwood, Martin (LD): https://www.libdems.org.uk/martin-horwood 
https://twitter.com/MartinChelt  
Howarth, John (Labour): https://www.linkedin.com/in/johnhowarth58/  
Jones, Jackie (Labour): https://www.linkedin.com/in/jackie-jones-0379227a/  
Jordan, Christina (Brexit): https://twitter.com/CJordanjb  
Kirton-Darling, Jude (Labour): https://www.linkedin.com/in/judith-kirton-darling-a735121/ 
Long, Naomi (Alliance): https://www.allianceparty.org/naomi  
Longworth, John (Brexit): https://www.linkedin.com/in/jlreputationunlimited/ 
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Lowe, Rupert (Brexit): https://twitter.com/RupertLowe10/status/1195008427778596867 
https://www.expressandstar.com/news/local-hubs/dudley/2019/08/02/rupert-lowe-and-
paul-brothwood-announced-as-brexit-party-candidates-for-dudley/  
de Lucy, Belinda (Brexit): https://debatingmatters.com/person/belinda-de-lucy/  
Magid, Magid (Green): https://www.linkedin.com/in/magicmagid/  
McIntyre, Anthea (Conservative): https://www.linkedin.com/in/anthea-mcintyre-37702126/  
McLeod, Aileen (SNP): https://twitter.com/AileenMcLeodSNP  
Mobarik, Nosheena (Conservative): https://twitter.com/NosheenaMobarik  
Mohammed, Shaffaq (LD): https://www.markpack.org.uk/140267/shaffaq-mohammed-
back-leader-sheffield-lib-dems/  
Monteith, Brian (Brexit): https://twitter.com/TheBluetrot https://find-and-update.company-
information.service.gov.uk/company/03502745/officers 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/mepdif/197704_DFI_LEG9_rev0_EN.pdf  
Moraes, Claude (Labour): https://www.linkedin.com/in/claude-moraes-obe-03a14a1b/  
Mummery, June (Brexit): https://www.lowestoftjournal.co.uk/news/june-mummery-brexit-
party-european-elections-1-5998300  
Nethsingha, Lucy (LD): https://twitter.com/Lnethsingha https://www.libdems.org.uk/lucy-
nethsingha  
Newton Dunn, Bill (LD): 
https://web.archive.org/web/20090106234251/http://www.libdems.org.uk/people/bill-
newton-dunn  
van Orden, Geoffery (Conservative): https://www.linkedin.com/in/geoffrey-van-orden-cbe-
0373397a/ 
Overgaard-Nielsen, Henrik (Brexit): https://www.linkedin.com/in/henrik-overgaard-nielsen-
974564208/ 
Palmer, Rory (Labour): https://www.prweek.com/article/1700950/former-labour-mep-takes-
charity-public-affairs-role  
Patten, Matthew (Brexit): https://www.linkedin.com/in/matthew-patten-11430121/ 
Phillips, Alex (Green): https://www.linkedin.com/in/alex-phillips-21126690/ 
https://www.instagram.com/alexforeurope/  
Phillips, Alexandra (Brexit): https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/what-is-gb-news-everything-
you-need-to-know/  
Porritt, Luisa (LD): https://www.linkedin.com/in/luisa-porritt-29521525/  
Pugh, Jake (Brexit): https://www.linkedin.com/in/jake-pugh-6200135/  
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Rees-Mogg, Annunziata (Brexit): https://www.linkedin.com/in/annunziata-rees-mogg-
73593936/ 
Ritchie, Sheila (LD): https://www.linkedin.com/in/sheila-ritchie-73a79538/ 
https://www.libdemvoice.org/sheila-ritchie-heads-scottish-european-list-60570.html?  
Rowett, Catherine (Green): https://catherinerowett.org/current-political-work/  
Rowland, Robert (Brexit): https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-kent-55788542  
Smith, Alyn (SNP): https://alynsmith.scot  
Stedman-Bryce, Louis (Brexit): https://www.linkedin.com/in/louis-s-3040ba2b/  
Tennant, John (Brexit): 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190519031311/https://www.theguardian.com/politics/201
9/may/06/brexit-party-mep-candidate-praised-use-of-nazi-slogan  
Tice, Richard (Brexit): https://richardtice.com/eurosceptic/  
Voaden, Caroline (LD): https://www.linkedin.com/in/carolinevoaden/  
Ward, Julie (Labour): https://www.linkedin.com/in/julie-ward-31aa661a/  
Wells, James (Brexit): https://www.linkedin.com/in/james-wells-03b6856/  
Widdecombe, Ann (Brexit): https://www.annwiddecombe.com/about-ann-widdecombe.php  
von Wiese, Irina (LD): https://www.linkedin.com/in/irinavonwiese/  
